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Structural Principles
and Presidential Succession*
BY HOWARD M. WASSERMAN"
INTRODUCTION
n a way it was like a bloodless coup. In March 1981, President
Ronald Reagan was undergoing emergency surgery after being
wounded in an assassination attempt, and Vice President George H.W.
Bush was outside of Washington. Secretary of State Alexander Haig
announced at a White House press briefing, "I am in control here, in the
White House," suggesting that, under the Constitution, he was next in the
line of succession.'
Most White House officials knew Haig was wrong.2 First, and often
overlooked, there was, in fact, no vacancy in the vice presidency at that
time and no need for Haig, or anyone else, to assume control in the White
House; the fact that Vice President Bush was not in Washington did not
render him "disabled" from assuming the presidency while Reagan was
undergoing surgery. Second, the issue of simultaneous vacancies, even
* Copyright C 2001 Howard M. Wasserman.
"" Visiting Assistant Professor, Florida State University College of Law. J.D.
1997, B.S. 1990, Northwestern University. Thanks to Martin Redish, Steven
Calabresi, Samantha Fisherman, Mark Josephson, and Matthew Umhofer for their
reviews of earlier drafts. Earlier versions of this Article were presented to the
faculties at Willamette University School ofLaw, Rutgers-Camden School of Law,
Chicago-Kent College of Law, and Florida State University College of Law; my
thanks for their comments and suggestions. Thanks to Jennifer, for everything else.
' See William F. Brown & Americo R. Cinquegrana, The Realities of Presi-
dential Succession: "The Emperor Has No Clones," 75 GEo. L.J. 1389, 1391-92
(1987); see also Richard V. Allen, The Day Reagan Was Shot, THE ATLANTc
MONTHLY, Apr. 2001, at 64-66 (discussing meetings and conversations among
cabinet members and presidential aides after Reagan was shot, including Haig's
assertion that he was next in the line of succession during meetings in the White
House Situation Room).2 See Allen, supra note 1, at 66.
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temporary ones, in both the presidency and the vice presidency is not
controlled by the Constitution, but rather by congressional statute? Third,
the statute, codified at 3 U.S.C. § 19, actually places the Speaker of the
House of Representatives next in line, followed by the President Pro
Tempore of the Senate.'
The spectacle of March 1981 illustrates the tension, uncertainty, and
confusion that arise with regard to many issues and questions of selection.
On one hand, as Herbert Wechsler once suggested, structural and selec-
tion issues often fall by the wayside ofjudicial and scholarly consideration,
given our focus on the power-distribution provisions of the Constitu-
tion.5 The Constitution did create and structure a government; it established
three distinct and co-equal branches and prescribed the qualifications
for the various offices,6 the terms, timing, and manner of selecting
3 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6 ("Congress may by Law provide forthe Case
of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the President and Vice
President, declaring what Officer shall then act as President, and such Officer shall
act accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected.");
3 U.S.C. § 19 (1994) (establishing order of double-vacancy succession); see also
Brown & Cinquegrana, supra note 1, at 1431-35; Americo R. Cinquegrana,
Presidential Succession Under 3 U. S.C. § 19 and the Separation ofPowers: "Ifat
First You Don't Succeed Try, Try Again, " 20 HASTiNGS CONST. L.Q. 105, 110-14
(1992).
4 See 3 U.S.C. § 19(a), (b).
' See Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of
the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54
COLUM. L. REv. 543, 543-44 (1954).
6 See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 ("No Person shall be a Representative who
shall not have attained to the Age of twenty five Years, and been seven Years a
Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of
that State in which he shall be chosen."); id § 3, cl. 3 ("No Person shall be a
Senator who shall not have attained to the Age ofthirty Years, and been nine Years
a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant
of that State for which he shall be chosen."); id at art. II, § 1, cl. 5 ("No Person
except a natural born Citizen... shall be eligible to the Office of President; neither
shall any Person be eligible to that Office who shall not have attained to the Age
of thirty five Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident within the United
States."); id. at art. I, § 6, cl. 2 ("[N]o Person holding any Office under the United
States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office."); see
also U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 800-01 (1995) (holding that
the Framers intended the Constitution to be the exclusive source of qualifications
for members of Congress and that the states could not establish additional
qualifications).
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officials,7 the manner of succession and filling vacancies,8 and the power
of Congress to fill any structural gaps with legislation.' On the other
hand, selection issues rarely are the subjects of constitutional litigation,
primarily because there can be no real legal dispute about many of these
provisions--the requirements that the President be thirty-five years old,
that Senators serve six-year terms, or that House members be popularly
elected are clear and not open to much interpretation or dispute as to their
meaning.
Selection rules and procedures may be established and detailed in the
Constitution itself, as most procedures were. They also may be established
pursuantto'Tramework legislation"--statutes passed according to ordinary
7 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 ("The House of Representatives shall be
composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several
States... ."); i d at amend. XVII, cl. 1 (providing that Senators shall be "elected by
the people thereof, for six years"); id at art. II, § 1, cl. 1-2 (providing that the
President shall hold office for four years and be chosen by Electors appointed by
each state); id at amend. XXII, § I ("No person shall be elected to the office of the
President more than twice.... ."); id at art. mH,§ 1 e"he Judges... shall hold their
Offices during good Behaviour..."); id at art. I, § 4, cl. 1 ("The Times, Places
and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be
prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof .... ."); see also U.S. Term
Limits, 514 U.S. at 783 (striking down state law imposing term limits on members
of Congress).
8 See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 4 ("When vacancies happen in the
Representation from any State, the Executive Authority thereof shall issue Writs
of Election to fill such Vacancies."); id at amend. XVII, cl. 2 (providing that when
"vacancies happen in the representation of any State in the Senate, the executive
authority of such State shall issue writs ofelection to fill such vacancies," provided
that the state executive could make temporary appointments until the vacancy could
be filled by election); id. at art. II, § 1, cl. 6 ("In Case of the Removal of the
President from Office, or of his Death, Resignation or Inability to discharge the
Powers and Duties of the said Office, the Same shall devolve on the Vice
President.... ."); id at amend. XXV, § 1 ("In case of the removal of the President
from office or of his death or resignation, the Vice President shall become
President.").
9See Steven G. Calabresi & Salkrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power to
Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 567 (1994) (noting that some structural
questions could be "punted to Congress and to future generations"); Steven G.
Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive,
Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1168 (1992) (stating that Congress's
power to structure the executive branch derives from the Necessary and Proper
Clause).
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Constitutional requirements of Bicameralism and Presentment"0 that fill in
the structural skeleton on those selection issues that have been left to
Congress, support and implement the Constitution's structural goals, and
further the constitutional allocation of authority." Succession in the event
of a vacancy in both the presidency and vice presidency is one selection
issue that was punted to the choices of Congress and that remains subject
to change through ordinary legislative processes.
2
In considering the selection of federal officials and selection proce-
dures, we seek answers to two questions: 1) how do we select the people
who will fill positions in the Federal government; and 2) why do we choose
a particular selection procedure? The answer to these questions requires
consideration of the Constitution's four underlying structural goals or
principles, which are implicated in designing, creating, and operating a
procedure for selecting government officers.
First is separation of powers, focusing on the separation and independ-
ence of each of three co-equal branches of the federal government in the
execution of governing powers and in the selection of the individuals who
serve in those branches. 3 Second is structural federalism, focusing on the
'o See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 ("Every Bill which shall have passed the
House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be
presented to the President of the United States."); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919,
946-51 (1983) (discussing the constitutional requirements of Bicameralism and
Presentment to the President as necessary to the passage of legislation).
" See Gerhard Casper, The Constitutional Organization ofthe Government, 26
WM. & MARY L. REv. 177, 187-88 (1985) (defining "framework legislation" as
legislation that "attempt[s] to implement structural goals of the Constitution" and
that "describes the constitutional allocation of authority and regulates the
decisionmaking of the President and the Congress").
12 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6 ("Congress may by Law provide for the
Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the President and Vice
President, declaring what Officer shall then act as President, and such Officer shall
act accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected.").
13 See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 289 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961); HARVEYC.MANSFIELD, JR.,AMERiCA'S CONSTITUTIONAL SOUL 115 (1991)
("Separation of powers is the chief of the 'auxiliary precautions' necessary against
oppression by government .... "); Ann Stuart Anderson, A 1787 Perspective on
Separation of Powers, in SEPARATION OF POWERS-DOEs IT STILL WORK? 147
(Robert A. Goldwin & Art Kaufman eds., 1986) ("The independence of the
branches is crucial for separation of powers in the American Constitution."); Laura
S. Fitzgerald, Cadenced Power: The Kinetic Constitution, 46 DUKE L.J. 679,688
(1997) ("[T]he separation of powers principle serves mostly as a line-drawing tool
to mark the boundary between one institution's constitutional tasks and those
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independent powers of the states, particularly their "r61e of great impor-
tance in the composition and selection of the central government."
14 Third
is democracy, meaning the role of the People as ultimate sovereign, voters,
and active members of the political community, in establishing the federal
government, choosing federal officials, and making political decisions. 5
And the fourth principle is political partisanship, focusing on organized
political parties and their role in the selection, organization, and operation
of the federal government 6 Separation of powers and federalism were the
reserved to another."); Martin H. Redish & Elizabeth J. Cisar, "IfAngels Were to
Govern": The Needfor Pragmatic Formalism in Separation ofPowers Theory, 41
DUKE L.J. 449,463 (1991) (arguing that separation of powers must operate "in a
manner that provides each branch with the formal tools necessary to limit the
excesses of its rivals" and "as a means of preventing a situation in which one
branch has acquired a level of power sufficient to allow it to subvert popular
sovereignty and individual liberty"); see also discussion infra notes 52-76 and
accompanying text.
14 Wechsler, supra note 5, at 543; see U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514
U.S. 779,838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("Federalism was ourNation's own
discovery."); ROBERT M. HARDAWAY, THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE AND THE
CONSTITUTION: THE CASE FOR PRESERVING FEDERALISM 83 (1994) (arguing that
the true genius of the Constitution was the creation of a system of federalism);
Wechsler, supra note 5, at 543 ("Federalism was the means and price of the
formation of the Union."); see also TiE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 259 (James
Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("[E]ach of the principle branches of the
federal government will owe its existence more or less to the favor of the State
governments ....").
15 See THE FEDERALIST No. 49, at 281-82 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961) ("[T]he people are the only legitimate fountain of power, and it is from
them that the constitutional charter, under which the several branches of
government hold their power, is derived .... ."); Wilson Carey McWilliams,
Democracy and the Citizen: Community, Dignity, andthe Crisis of Contemporary
Politics in America, in How DEMOCRATIC IS THE CONSTITUTION? 79 (Robert A.
Goldwin & William A. Schambra eds., 1980) ("Democracy is inseparable from
democratic ways of framing and arguing for political choices."); Burt Neuborne,
Making the Law Safe for Democracy: A Review of "The Law of Democracy etc., "
97 MICH. L. REv. 1578, 1592 (1999) (book review) (arguing that the
"constitutional text reveals anormative vision of democracy"); seealso discussion
infra notes 172-243 and accompanying text.
16 See RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE IDEA OF A PARTY SYSTEM 70 (1969)
(arguing that parties became a part of the machinery of government at an early
point); Steven G. Calabresi, Political Parties as Mediating Institutions, 61 U. CHI.
L. REv. 1479, 1530 (1994) [hereinafter Calabresi, Political Parties] (arguing that
parties are effective in serving labeling and information functions to the public);
2001-20021
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key principles at the time of the framing of the Constitution. 7 Democracy
and political partisanship have increased in focus and importance as the
Constitution and the federal government have progressed, both through
formal constitutional amendments and through more informal, sub-
constitutional developments."
Structural principles guide decisionmakers-whether the drafters of a
constitutional provision, legislatures, orvoters-in choosing, creating, and
operating selection procedures and in selecting office holders. These
principles are independent ideals with inherent value that decisionmakers
should attempt to adhere to and advance in designing a selection procedure.
Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back Into the Political Safeguards of
Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 215,267 (2000) (describing political parties as
one mediating institution helping to manage modem politics); Michael J. Malbin,
Political Parties Across the Separation of Powers, in AMERICAN POLITICAL
PARTIES AND CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS 75 (Peter W. Schramm & Bradford P.
Wilson eds., 1993) (arguing that parties work across branches and bring
coordination to the branches); Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr., Political Parties and
American Constitutionalism, in AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTIES AND
CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS, supra, at 1 (arguing that parties, not mentioned in the
Constitution, organize by combining branches and functions); see also discussion
infra notes 93-155 and accompanying text.
17 See Vikram David Amar, Indirect Effects of Direct Election: A Structural
Examination oftheSeventeenthAmendment, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1347,1350 (1996)
[hereinafter V. Amar, Indirect Effects] (describing federalism and separation of
powers as the two great themes of the constitutional design); see also HARDAWAY,
supra note 14, at 13 (arguing that separation of powers was at the "heart of the
constitutional fabric"); id at 14 (discussing the framers' need to protect states in
designing a scheme of presidential selection); HOFSTADTER, supra note 16, at 52
(arguing that the framers relied on the "classic doctrine of the separation of
powers").
8 See Walter Berns, Does the Constitution "Secure These Rights"?, in How
DEMOCRATIC IS THE CONSTITUTION?, supra note 15, at 59 ("The Constitution is
more democratic today than in the past and promising (or threatening) to become
still more democratic."); Mansfield, supra note 16, at 14-15 (describing the "long-
term, uninterrupted trend toward democratization" and the fact that this has been
led by "parties and by their great leaders in the critical elections"); McWilliams,
supra note 15, at 79 ("Most Americans would agree that the Constitution has
become more democratic with time."); Abner J. Mikva, Doubting Our Claims to
Democracy, 39 ARIz. L. REv. 793, 797 (1997) ("We have progressed from those
undemocratic beginnings."); PeterM. Shane, DisappearingDemocracy: HowBush
v. Gore Undermined the Federal Right to Vote for Presidential Electors, 29 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 535, 548 (2001) (describing "the plain democratic trajectory of
constitutional development since 1868").
[VOL. 90
STRUCTURAL PRINCIPLES
The principles are not necessarily coextensive with the Constitution. That
is, a particular selection procedure may be inconsistent with one or more
structural principles without necessarily being inconsistent with the text of
the Constitution.
Structural principles help explain selection decisions. The creation and
application of a selection procedure reflects a choice or emphasis on some
principle or principles over others. Choices as to which principle to
emphasize can and will change over time, and a change in emphasis will
require and produce a different or amended selection method. For example,
the move from legislative selection to direct popular election of United
States Senators in the Seventeenth Amendment reflected an obvious
emphasis on democracy and a decision to advance democracy over
federalism. 9
Every selection decision can and should be examined against these
principles to determine what principle or principles are at work, whether
the chosen procedure properly reflects these principles, and whether a
different selection procedure would better serve the desired principles.
Structural principles must be considered individually and in an overall
balance. A particular selection procedure might emphasize one principle,
but at the same time be so inconsistent with others as to be problematic.
The double-vacancy succession statute illustrates the use and operation
of structural principles in designing and applying framework legislation.
The current version of § 19 provides for succession by the Speaker of the
House, then President Pro Tempore of the Senate, then cabinet officers,
beginning with the Secretary of State and proceeding according to the age
of each department ° The statute was passed in 1947 and was the third
attempt to establish a double-vacancy succession order 1 The new version
was passed at the urging of President Harry S. Truman, who explicitly
" See U.S. CONST. amend. XViI, cl. 1 ("The Senate of the United States shall
be composed of two Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof .... ")
amending U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1 ("The Senate of the United States shall be
composed of two Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof
... ."); see also Jay S. Bybee, Ulysses at the Mast: Democracy, Federalism, and
the Sirens' Song of the Seventeenth Amendment, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 500, 538
(1997) ("IT]he people... simply preferred democracy to representation and were
willing to shoulder the loss to constitutional federalism.").20 See 3 U.S.C. § 19 (1994).
21 See Akhil Reed Amar & Vlkram David Amar, Is the Presidential Succession
Law Constitutional?, 48 STAN. L. REV. 113, 132-35 (1995) [hereinafter Amar &
Amar, Succession]; Cinquegrana, supranote 3, at 110-11; see also discussion infra
notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
2001-20021
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emphasized the democratic principle and his view that the presidency
should be filled by a member of Congress, who has stood for popular
election at some level, rather than by an unelected cabinet officer.' Truman
also believed that Speaker succession made it more likely that the same
party would retain control of the executive branch, because the Speaker and
President often would be in party agreement.'
But a closer examination of the statute shows that 1) it actually is not
the best way to emphasize and serve the democratic principle and 2) it is
entirely inconsistent with the separation of powers and political partisan-
ship principles to a degree that cannot otherwise be remedied without
changing the statute.
There has been renewed interest in double-vacancy succession in the
wake of September 11, given evidence that the terrorist attack may have
been intended to reach both the President on board Air Force One and the
Vice President in the White House--events which could have triggered §
19. This new interest provides an appropriate moment to review the statute
and to ensure the creation of the best succession scheme. It compels us to
examine and consider the inconsistencies between § 19 and these structural
principles and to establish a succession scheme that is most consistent with
the principles underlying constitutional selection issues. Such a scheme
should include only cabinet officers at the top of the line of succession and
should provide for a special election to choose a new President and Vice
President within approximately one year of the event that triggers the
statute.
This Article will examine the nature, details, origins, and evolution of
three structural principles--separation of powers, political partisanship,
and democracy-and the role each plays under the Constitution, particu-
larly with regard to selection of the President and the executive branch. It
then will consider § 19 in light of each principle and examine how
consistent the statute is with each. Ultimately, it concludes that the current
succession order is not consistent with these three principles, either
individually or in an overall balance. It would be more consistent to amend
the statute again and to establish succession by cabinet officers, with a
provision for a special election to choose a new President and Vice
President.24
' See Harry S. Truman, Special Message to the Congress on the Succession to
the Presidency, PUB. PAPERS 124 (June 19, 1945); Brown & Cinquegrana, supra
note 1, at 1421-22 & n.111; see also discussion infra notes 42-47 and
accompanying text.
' See Truman, supra note 22, at 129.
24See discussion infra notes 268-82 and accompanying text.
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I. STATUTORY HISTORY AND PROVISIONS
Under Article II, Section 1, Clause 6 of the Constitution, as affirmed
by the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, if there is a vacancy in the presidency,
the Vice President becomes President.' The Constitution grants Congress
the power to provide by law for vacancies in both offices, "declaring what
Officer shall then act as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly,
until the Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected." '26
Two points of this provision are notable. First, anyone who succeeds
under such a statute does not become President, only acting president. The
difference is largely semantic, as it appears that the acting president
exercises the executive power under the Constitution, just as the President
would. This is a product of both the plain language of the Constitution and
the general separation of powers prohibition on Congress selecting the
President." Second, the provision specifically refers to "officers" acting as
President; whatever the scope of that term, clearly Congress could not
designate any random private person or anyone outside the federal
government as the acting president.2
Congress has exercised its Constitutional power to legislate for
vacancies in both offices on three occasions. The first statute was passed
in 1792, establishing succession by the President Pro Tempore of the
Senate and then the Speaker of the House, with a provision for a special
election to be called by the Secretary of State within thirty-four days to
choose a President and Vice President 9 In 1886, the statute was amended
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6 ("In Case of the Removal of the President
from Office, or of his Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and
Duties of the said Office, the Same shall devolve on the Vice President... ."); id
at amend. XXV, § 1 ("In case of the removal of the President from office or of his
death or resignation, the Vice President shall become President.").
26 Id at art. II, § 1, cl. 6.
27 See Brown & Cinquegrana, supra note 1, at 1436 (stating that a § 19
successor becomes acting president because the Constitution does not authorize
Congress to use its legislative powers to create a new President); see also
HARDAWAY, supra note 14, at 13 (discussing the rejection of congressional
selection at the Founding).
' See Amar & Amar, Succession, supra note 21, at 120 ("Congress can
designate only officers, not private citizens, to act as President ....").
29 See idl at 132-33; Akhil Reed Amar, Presidents Without Mandates (With
SpecialEmphasis on Ohio), 67 U. CIN. L. REv. 375,384-85 (1999) [hereinafter A.
Amar, Mandates]; Brown & Cinquegrana, supra note 1, at 1418; Cinquegrana,
supra note 3, at 110.
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to provide for cabinet succession, beginning with the Secretary of State.3"
This change was brought about in part by concerns for the long stretches
in which the offices of Speaker and President Pro Tern were vacant during
the previous century, as well as concerns for the conflicts of interest that
arose under the original statute'
In 1947, Congress amended the statute to its current version, codified
at 3 U.S.C. § 19. The amended law provides for succession by the Speaker
and then the President Pro Tern, followed by cabinet officers, beginning
with the Secretary of State and proceeding according to the age of the
department?
2
Anyone who succeeds under § 19 must resign her prior office.33 This
is a constitutional requirement for the Speaker and President Pro Tern
pursuant to the Incompatibility Clause, which prohibits members of
Congress from serving in the executive branch?4 It is not a requirement for
30 See Amar & Amar, Succession, supra note 21, at 133-34; A. Amar,
Mandates, supra note 29, at 386; Brown & Cinquegrana, supra note 1, at 1419-20
& n.109; Cinquegrana, supra note 3, at 110.
31 See Amar& Amar, Succession, supranote 21, at 134; Brown & Cinquegrana,
supra note 1, at 1419-20; see also discussion infra notes 78-81 and accompanying
text.
32 See 3 U.S.C. § 19(a), (b) (1994); id § 19(d)(1) (establishing succession order
of Secretary of State, Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary of Defense, Attorney
General, Secretary of the Interior, Secretary of Agriculture, Secretary of
Commerce, Secretary of Labor, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Secretary
of Housing and Urban Development, Secretary of Transportation, Secretary of
Energy, Secretary of Education, Secretary of Veterans Affairs); see also Amar &
Amar, Succession, supra note 21, at 134-35; A. Amar, Mandates, supra note 29,
at 386; Brown & Cinquegrana, supra note 1, at 1431-33; Cinquegrana, supra note
3, at 111-13.
33 See 3 U.S.C. § 19(a)(1), (b), (d)(3); Amar & Amar, Succession, supra note
21, at 135 (criticizing the requirement that a cabinet officer be made to resign her
post in order to act as president, because such officer would be out of ajob when
the temporary disability was removed); Brown & Cinquegrana, supra note 1, at
1437 (describing the problem that anyone who resigned to act as President during
a temporary vacancy would be out of ajob altogether when the President returmed).34 See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 6, cl. 2 ("[N]o Person holding any Office under the
United States shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in
Office."); Steven G. Calabresi & Joan L. Larsen, One Person, One Office:
Separation of Powers or Separation of Personnel?, 79 CORNELL L. REv. 1045,
1047, 1048-49 (1994) (discussing the importance to separation of powers of this
clause); see also discussion supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
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cabinet officers: a President is not constitutionally barred from serving as
her own cabinet secretary. Either legislative officer may decline to become
acting president-by not resigning her legislative office and seat, there-
by leaving herself constitutionally disabled from serving in the execu-
tive branch-and may allow the executive power to devolve to the
cabinet.35
However, a cabinet officer serves as acting president only until a
"prior-entitled individual is able to act," which statutory term includes the
Speaker and President Pro Tem 6 By resigning the speakership and her
House seat, the Speaker removes her "disability" from being acting
president and becomes a constitutionally qualified prior-entitled individual
who now may supplant the cabinet officer as acting president?7 This may
happen at any time and for any reason, for the duration of the presidential
term, by anyone occupying the speakership or presidency pro tempore,
including someone who initially had declined to assume the executive
power.
s
Finally, the current statute does not provide for a special election;
assuming no supplantation and permanent vacancies in both the presidency
and the vice presidency, the acting president will serve until the next
New Jersey provides a good contrast. The state constitution provides that, in the
event of a vacancy in the office of Governor, the President of the Senate is to
assume the powers of Governor "for the time being," with no requirement that she
resign the legislative office. See N.J. CONST. art. 5, § 1, 6. The New Jersey
Constitution does not contain an equivalent of the Incompatibility Clause. When
New Jersey Governor Christine Todd Whitman was appointed to head the
Environmental Protection Agency in 2001, Senate President Donald DiFrancesco
became acting governor, while retaining his Senate seat and his position as Senate
President.
11 See 3 U.S.C. § 19(a)(1), (b); see also Cinquegrana, supra note 3, at 114.
36 See 3 U.S.C. § 19(dX2); see also Amar & Amar, Succession, supra note 21,
at 135; Brown & Cinquegrana, supra note 1, at 1437-38; Cinquegrana, supra note
3, at 114-15.
"See Brown & Cinquegrana, supra note 1, at 1437-38.
's See Cinquegrana, supra note 3, at 115 (arguing that "prior-entitled
individual" would include anyone who subsequently became Speaker or President
Pro Tern, even if the prior holder of that office had declined to become acting
President); see also Amar & Amar, Succession, supra note 21, at 135 (arguing that
the supplantation provision violates the Constitution because the Succession Clause
gives Congress the power to designate an acting president who shall act until the
presidential disability be removed or a new President elected but does not permit
Congress to declare that an officer shall act "until some other suitor wants the
job").
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quadrennial presidential election. 9 This is true whether six months or three
and a half years remain on the current presidential term. This lack of
temporal limitation requires that the acting president be accorded the same
independence from Congress and the same vitality in executive action as
would a duly elected President, given the possibility that she will serve a
significant amount of time.40 The lack of temporal limitation also raises
concerns that someone not elected to the presidency will occupy the White
House for a substantial period of time.4
President Harry Truman first proposed a new succession statute in a
1945 message to Congress, suggesting that the law be amended to
substitute legislative succession for the then-existing cabinet succession.
Truman, who had succeeded to the presidency following the death of
President Franklin Roosevelt and served his first term without a Vice
President,42 sent the message when he nominated George Marshall to be
Secretary of State. Truman realized that, under the law in place at the time,
he was appointing his immediate potential successor, the person who would
succeed to the presidency were Truman unable to complete his term.
Truman did not "believe that in a democracy this power should rest with
the Chief Executive." '3
Several points in Truman's message are worth emphasizing. First,
Truman argued:
In so far as possible, the office of the President should be filled by an
elective officer. There is no officer in our system of government, besides
the President and Vice President, who has been elected by all the voters
of the country.
39 See 3 U.S.C. § 19(c)(2) ("An individual acting as president... shall continue
to act until the expiration of the then current Presidential term, except that... if his
discharge of the powers and duties of the office is founded in whole or in part on
the inability of the President or Vice President, then he shall act only until the
removal of the disability of one of such individuals."); id § 19(d)(2) (same as to
cabinet officers); see also Amar & Amar, Succession, supra note 21, at 134-35;
Brown & Cinquegrana, supra note 1, at 1436; Cinquegrana, supra note 3, at 113-
14.
"o See discussion supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
41 See discussion supra notes 268-69 and accompanying text.
41 Prior to passage of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment in 1967, the Constitution
did not provide a mechanism for appointing a new Vice President when the Vice
President had ascended to the presidency or when the vice presidency had become
vacant; the office remained vacant until the next regular presidential election.
'3 See Truman, supra note 22, at 129.
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The Speaker of the House of Representatives, who is elected in his
own district, is also elected to be the presiding officer of the House by a
vote of all the Representatives of all the people of the country. As a result,
I believe that the Speaker is the official in the Federal Government, whose
selection next to that of the President and Vice President, can be most
accurately said to stem from the people themselves."4
Second, he compared the Senate and House:
Members of the Senate are not as closely tied in by the elective process
to the people as are Members of the House of Representatives. A
completely new House is elected every two years, and always at the same
time as the President and Vice President. Usually it is in agreement
politically with the Chief Executive. Only one-third of the Senate,
however, is elected with the President and Vice President. The Senate
might, therefore, have a majority hostile to the policies of the President,
and might conceivably fill the Presidential office with one not in
sympathy with the will of the majority of the people.45
Third, Truman suggested that there should be a "special election called
for the purpose of electing a new President and Vice President."4 The
President elected at this special election would fill only the remainder of
the term of the deceased or disabled President and Vice President; a
President then would be elected during the next regularly scheduled
quadrennial election 7 This last point did not make it into the final statute.
II. SUCCESSION STATUTE AND STRUCTURAL PRINCIPLES
We now consider the nature, history, and development of three prin-
ciples-separation of powers, political partisanship, and democracys -and
44Id
4 1 Id at 129-30.
46Id at 130.47 See id
4" Federalism has dropped out of the equation on this particular framework
legislation. The power to designate who shall act as President was left to Congress,
not to the states, and the term "officers" in the Constitution certainly cannot be read
to include state officials.
In the aftermath of September 11, some have proffered the danger ofa massive
terrorist attack killing the President, Vice President, and everyone else in the
possible line of statutory succession, arguing for extending the line of statutory
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how they particularly affect selection of the President and the executive
branch. We examine how consistent the current succession statute is with
each of these principles, considered individually and in an overall balance.
The inconsistency of § 19 with these principles does not necessarily
render the statute unconstitutional. Akhil and Vik Amar have made that
argument, however, suggesting that legislative succession is not permitted
under the plain language of the Constitution. They argue that the Constitu-
tion refers to "officers," which means "Officers of the United States,"
which means only executive branch officers, not legislative branch
officers.49 In their view, the most straightforward reading of the Constitu-
tion's text, the clear implication of five related yet distinct structural
considerations (including separation of powers), and the spirit of twentieth
century developments "all pointto the same conclusion: Legislators are not
'Officers' under the Succession Clause. '
succession to include state governors, in order to designate a new President and to
ensure the continued existence of the federal government. It is questionable
whether such amass annihilation of the federal government is any more likely from
a terrorist attack now than it was from a Soviet nuclear attack during the Cold War.
Indeed, it arguably would have been easier to wipe out the entire federal
government with a large-scale nuclear first strike than with a coordinated series of
multiple individual terrorist attacks. Moreover, one Cabinet member always
remains behind when the President addresses ajoint session of Congress, the one
time when all of the upper levels of the federal government are in the same place.
The proposed change to the statute would require consideration of the
federalism principle. We do note that adding governors to the line of succession
would first require an amendment to Article I, Section 1, Clause 6, to remove or
change the word "officer," which, regardless of its precise scope, does not include
governors or other state officials, who are not officers under the law, authority, or
government of the United States. See Amar & Amar, Succession, supra note 21,
at 114-17 (discussing several uses of the word "officer" throughout the
Constitution, all of which specifically reference the United States as the source of
authority for that officer).
In any event, such a change is a separate issue and beyond the scope of this
Article, as it focuses on the lower end of succession and how far down the line
should extend in order to account for every eventuality. Our focus is on the top of
succession and the question of who should be the first officer in line to become
acting president in the event of a double vacancy.49 See Amar & Amar, Succession, supra note 21, at 115-16 (arguing that federal
legislators are not "Officers under the United States" or "Officers of the United
States").
" Id at 136; see also Steven G. Calabresi, The Political Question of Presi-
dential Succession, 48 STAN. L. REv. 155, 156 (1995) [hereinafter Calabresi,
PresidentialSuccession] (agreeing with the Amars' conclusion, but arguingthatthe
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This Article proceeds from the assumption that § 19 is constitutional,
that the Constitution gives Congress broad discretion in designing this
particular piece of framework legislation, and that Congress could
designate a legislative branch officer to become acting president, if it chose
to do so. Our analysis uses structural principles as guides to the exercise of
that discretion, apart from the question of constitutionality. The question
is not what Congress could do as a matter of power but what it should do
as a matter of structural policy.
Our focus is on what is the best succession scheme, as a normative
matter. These three principles show that, regardless of what Congress could
do under the Constitution, it should replace the current statute with one that
provides for succession only by cabinet officers, with a special election to
choose a new President and Vice President to serve the remainder of the
unexpired four-year term.5n ' This would be more consistent with separation
of powers, political partisanship, and democracy, considered individually
and in an overall balance.
A. Separation of Powers
1. Separation of Powers Considered
Separation of powers was intended to be the Constitution's primary
structural principle.5 2 To the Framers, accumulation of all power in a small
number of hands was, in Madison's words, "the very definition of
tyranny." 3 Power was to be divided among three coordinate branches of
the federal government; each branch was to have its own realm of power
and was to be provided with the formal tools, means, and will necessary to
issue of constitutionality is a political question that is not subject to judicial
review); John F. Manning, Not Proved: Some Lingering Questions About
Legislative Succession to the Presidency, 48 STAN. L. REv. 141, 142 (1995)
(suggesting reasons to hesitate before firmly declaring the current succession order
unconstitutional).
51 See Calabresi, Presidential Succession, supra note 50, at 156; see also
discussion infra notes 268-82 and accompanying text.
52See HARDAWAY, supra note 14, at 13 (describing separation ofpowers as the
"heart of the constitutional fabric"); HOFSTADTER, supra note 16, at 52 (arguing
that systemic protections in the Constitution were to be provided by the "classic
doctrine of separation of powers").
53 THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 269 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
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protect that realm.n' The result is a system in which the accumulation ofall
power in the same or a limited number of hands would be difficult or
impossible, but also one in which the diffusion of power makes sudden,
rapid, or dramatic policy action difficult and unlikely.5
The Framers particularly recognized the need for separation in
selection and in the procedures for selecting people to serve in the various
departments in the federal government. As Madison wrote:
[E]ach department should have a will of its own; and consequently should
be so constituted that the members of each should have as little agency as
possible in the appointment of the members of the others.56
Each department represents separate, independent, and distinct constituen-
cies, and the members of each constituency are responsible for the
I See Redish & Cisar, supra note 13, at 463 (arguing that separation of powers
must operate "in a manner that provides each branch with the formal tools
necessary to limit the excesses of its rivals" and "as a means of preventing a
situation in which one branch has acquired a level of power sufficient to allow it
to subvert popular sovereignty and individual liberty"); see also MANSFIELD, supra
note 13, at 115 ("Separation of powers is the chief of the 'auxiliary precautions'
necessary against oppression by government. . . ."); Anderson, supra note 13, at
147 ('The independence of the branches is crucial for separation of powers inthe
American Constitution."); Fitzgerald, supra note 13, at 686 ("[T]he separation of
powers principle serves mostly as a line-drawing tool to mark the boundary
between one institution's constitutional tasks and those reserved to another.").
5 See Calabresi & Larsen, supra note 34, at 1047 (arguing that separation of
powers was one way the Framers sought to make it"hard for government to act");
James W. Ceaser, In Defense of Separation of Powers, in SEPARATION OF
POWERS-DOES IT STILL WORK?, supra note 13, at 180 (discussing the need to use
political power with energy and discretion at critical moments, which separation of
powers restricts); Lloyd N. Cutler, To Form a Government, in SEPARATION OF
POWERS-DOES IT STILL WORK?, supra note 13, at 2 [hereinafter Cutler, To Form
a Government] (arguing that separation of powers "has become a structure that
almost guarantees stalemate today"); Richard A. Epstein, In Praise of Divided
Government, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 567, 571 (1990) (arguing that separation ofpower
is "a way to slow down the political juggernaut."); James Q. Wilson, Political
Parties and the Separation ofPowers, in SEPARATION OF POWERS-DOES IT STILL
WORK?, supra note 13, at 18 (arguing that the chief criticism of the separation of
powers is that it inhibits the capacity of the government "to enact policies that are
bold, timely, and comprehensive").
56 THE FEDERALIST No. 5 1, at 289 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
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appointment of that branch of the government." The House is closest to the
People, and its members are popularly elected by the smallest group of
voters.58 The Senate is closest to the states as states; as originally designed
its members were selected by the legislatures of the several states, and with
direct election Senators still represent a single state's broad and more
diverse constituency.59 The President is chosen by a compound of all of
these constituencies, reflecting the nation as a whole or, more specifically
and accurately, reflecting a broad coalition of state constituencies.' The
7 See Calabresi & Larsen, supra note 34, at 1093 (arguing that the Constitution
creates "three different and independent electoral constituencies"); Fitzgerald,
supra note 13, at 750 (arguing that each of the three branches are different
manifestations of the same authority, "speaking with different voices and through
different'channels' "); Charles M. Hardin, The Separation ofPowers Needs Major
Revision, in SEPARATIONOF POWERS-DOES ITSTILL WORK?, supra note 13, at 90
("[T]he president and the Congress have somewhat different constituencies .... ").
58 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 212 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) ("The House of Representatives will derive its powers from the people of
America .... ."); see also Amar & Amar, Succession, supra note 21, at 130
(discussing the "narrow, local strategies by which Congressmen secure election in
their states and districts, with promises of pork and parks"); Calabresi & Larsen,
supra note 34, at 1093; Fitzgerald, supra note 13, at 748 ("The citizen within her
House constituency thus may identify herself and her political priorities primarily
on the basis of local concerns."); Wechsler, supra note 5, at 552 (emphasizing the
localism and separatism of Congress).
59 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 212 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) ("The Senate, on the other hand, will derive its powers from the States as
political and coequal societies .... ."); see also Calabresi, Political Parties, supra
note 16, at 1507 07Senators represent states... ."); Calabresi & Larsen, supra note
34, at 1093 (describing each Senator's constituency of a single state); Fitzgerald,
supra note 13, at 749 ("[A] Senate constituency may take on the more polyglot
character of the state as a whole.").
60 See THE FEDERALISTNO. 39, at 212 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
196 1) ("The executive power will be derived from a very compound source."); id.
(describing the method of selecting the President and its many components); see
also Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive,
48 ARK. L. REV. 23,59 (1995) [hereinafter Calabresi,SomeNormatveArguments]
("[T]he President is unique in our constitutional system as being the only official
who is accountable to a national voting electorate and no one else."); Calabresi,
Political Parties, supia note 16, at 1508 ("The President is electorally responsible
to the nation as a whole."); Calabresi & Larsen, supra note 34, at 1093 (describing
the President's and Vice President's national constituency); Fitzgerald, supra note
13, at 754 (emphasizing the President's political identification with and
dependence on a national constituency containing elements of, but independent of,
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President is to be independent not only of Congress for her appointment,
but also independent of the individual smaller constituencies represented
in Congress.61
To the extent such clear divisions in selection are impossible or
inexpedient, other protections maintain the necessary separation and
independence of the branches.62 Madison specifically cited the obvious
example of the federal judiciary: Judges are nominated by the President and
confirmed by the Senate, but once appointed, the protections of life tenure
and guaranteed salary "soon destroy all sense of dependence" on the
appointing branches.63
Similarly, the Senate's substantial role in confirming high-level
executive branch officers, such as cabinet secretaries, was seen as an
important check on the appointment of unfit characters and a way to ensure
some care on the part of the President in making her selections." However,
the choice of executive branch officers ultimately remains with the
President.' Moreover, once confirmed, cabinet officers generally serve
under the exclusive policy control and at the pleasure of the President.'
smaller constituencies).
61 See Fitzgerald, supra note 13, at 754-55 ("Article I's electoral college makes
the President politically dependent on a national People and therefore relatively
independent not only of the Congress institutionally, but of the particular
constituencies already represented in its two houses.").
62 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 289 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) (stating that some deviations from strict separation must be admitted).
63 See id; see also U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 ("The Judges... shall hold their
Offices during good Behaviour, and shall . .. receive for their Services, a
Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in
Office.").
6 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (describing Senate role in providing
"Advice and Consent" to President's nomination of ambassadors, public ministers
and consulsjudges, and other officers of the United States); THE FEDERALISTNO.
76, at 425 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see also STEPHEN
L. CARTER, THE CONFIRMATION MEss 12 (1994) (discussing initial concerns with
the constitutional plan for executive appointments and the fact that the
constitutional scheme has caused "no end of trouble").
6
1 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 65, at 364 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961) (stating that the executive is to be the principal agent in the appointment
process); see also CARTER, supra note 64, at 15 ("What makes our confirmation
process messy, however, is our inability to reach any sort of consensus on what
'close scrutiny' involves.").
' See Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 9, at 1168 (arguing that the President
must maintain the constitutional power to control his subordinates); Gary Lawson,
The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARv. L. REv. 1231, 1242-43
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Congressional influence is limited to removal through the laborious
impeachment process (unlikely), control over agency and department
funding, and the congressional oversight process, in which committees
monitor, question, and challenge the actions of cabinet officers.
It was with this understanding of separation of powers that the Framers
specifically considered and rejected legislative selection of the President.
The Framers feared that an executive so chosen would be too beholden and
dependent on the legislature to exercise any real power or discretion,
incapable of initiative, and motivated more by a desire to please Congress
in order to gain reelection than by a desire to exercise independent
judgment in acting for the public good.67 The tendency in a republican
government, Madison suggested, was the aggrandizement of the legislative
branch;' a substantial legislative role in the selection of the executive
would further enable such aggrandizement. Members of Congress are
prohibited even from serving as individual presidential electors and directly
choosing the President69 Moreover, Congress may remove the President
only through the cumbersome impeachment process."
(1994) (discussing the President's power to control his subordinates in the
executive branch).
67 See HARDAWAY, supra note 14, at 13 (discussing arguments against
legislative selection and the fear of an executive "beholden" to Congress and
"under the influence of an improper obligation" to Congress); TADAH]SAKURODA,
THE ORIGINS OF THETWELFTHAMENDMENT 8 (1994) (discussing fear of executive
becoming too "dependent on legislators, incapable of initiative, and worried about
pleasing them in order to gain reelection"); Anderson, supra note 13, at 147 ("The
delegates agreed generally that an executive chosen by the legislature was not
independent."); Cinquegrana, supra note 3, at 123 (discussing Gouvemeur
Morris's argument that an executive chosen by the national legislature could not
be independent of it, leading to legislative usurpation of executive power); Hardin,
supranote 57, at 9 ("[N]either the presidentnor the Congress exercises significant
influence on the nomination of the other."); William Josephson & Beverly J. Ross,
Repairing the Electoral College, 22 J. LEGIS. 145, 152 (1996) (discussing Morris's
arguments).6, See THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 277 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
69 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 ("[N]o Senator or Representative... shall
be appointed an Elector.").
7 See i d § 4 ("The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United
States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of;
Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors."); see also
Cinquegrana, supra note 3, at 129 (stating that the Framers abhorred "any process
that would cleave the fine lines of separated powers they crafted and create a chief
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The legislature plays a substantial role in selecting the executive only
if no candidate captures a majority in the Electoral College, in which case
the House chooses the President (and the Senate chooses the Vice
President) from among the top electoral vote-getters.7 Some Framers
believed that a single candidate rarely could achieve sufficient nationwide
support to gain an electoral majority, resulting in all or most presidential
elections being thrown to the House of Representatives, with the Electoral
College functioning largely as a nominating body.72 Even in a contingency
election, Congress is not entirely free in choosing the executive but is
limited to voting for the candidates nominated by the Electoral College
process." Congress also may dispute and disregard particular electoral
votes, pursuant to statutory procedures requiring, inter alia, an initial
challenge from a member of each house and the agreement of both houses
to invalidate a particular vote.7' In either event, Congress is not to choose
an executive from among its own ranks based on someone holding a
executive whose continued tenure in office would be wholly and directly dependent
upon the sufferance of the legislature.").
71 See U.S. CONST. amend. XII (providing that, in the event of no majority
winner, the House was to choose the President from among the top three vote
recipients and the Senate was to choose the Vice President from among the top two
vote recipients), amending U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3; see also KURODA, supra
note 67, at 104-05 (discussing House contingency election for President in 1800).
'SeeHARDAWAY, supranote 14, at 5 ("[T]he Electoral College has functioned
far more successflly than was ever envisioned by the constitutional framers, and
has, over the past 100 years, consistently produced clear-cut winners.... ."); i d at
13 (arguing that the drafters assumed that it would be very unlikely that any
presidential candidate after Washington would receive a majority of electoral
votes); Wechsler, supra note 5, at 553 (arguing that, had the Electoral College
functioned as expected, it would have been a nominating body, leaving selection
mainly to the House); Ann Althouse, Electoral College Reform: Dj& Vu, 95 Nw.
U. L. REv. 993,995-96 (2001) (book review) ("It was thought at the time that the
electors would typically find themselves unable to reach a majority, thus invoking
the contingency that the House of Representatives would make the final choice.
Some imagined that the electoral college would operate as little more than a
nominating convention leading up to the House choice.").
' See Amar & Amar, Succession, supra note 21, at 125 (arguing that in
contingency election, Congress's discretion is cabined, limited to voting for
candidates nominated by the Electoral College process).
74 See 3 U.S.C. § 15 (1994) (providing that every objection shall be signed by
at least one Senator and one House member and that the two Houses concurrently
may reject votes); see also id §§ 15-18 (establishing procedures for congressional
objections to electoral votes).
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particular legislative seat and office (such as the speakership) or by virtue
of that person having gained enough popularity within one house of
Congress to secure that office. 5
A member of Congress also is specifically prohibited from serving in
the executive branch, a prohibition that some have argued is the key to
separation of powers.76 A member of Congress may become President or
serve in the cabinet, of course; however, she may do so only by resigning
her congressional seat and by passing through whatever selection procedure
is required for that executive office, be it election or Senate confirmation.
This is particularly critical with regard to a member of Congress becoming
President, as it ensures that she gains the support of the relevant national
electoral constituency and not just of the state or local constituency that
initially placed her in Congress. Separation of powers commands this
intermediate selection step before a member of the legislature assumes the
executive power.
2. Separation of Powers and Succession
Given the scope and nature of separation of powers, it is entirely
inconsistent to have executive power devolve to a legislative officer, even
on an acting basis, as occurs in the operation of§ 19. Most obviously, it
establishes precisely what the framers expressly rejected during the
Convention-Congress effectively selects a President from among its own
ranks and someone assumes the executive power solely by virtue of her
holding a seat and office in one house of Congress and of having gained
enough support among members of the House to secure that office.'
Requiring the Speaker's resignation from the House, while perhaps
rendering § 19 constitutional under the Incompatibility Clause, does not
resolve the separation of powers concerns. Having legislative officers in the
line of succession creates negative incentives and conflicts of interest in
carrying out congressional duties. For example, both the Speaker and the
President Pro Tem, as members of Congress, play a role in the impeach-
75 See Amar & Amar, Succession, supra note 21, at 124 ("A person should not
become President merely by currying favor with the legislature.").76 See U.S. CoNsT. art. 1, § 6, cl. 2 ("[N]o Person holding any Office under the
United States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in
Office."); Calabresi & Larsen, supra note 34, at 1048-49 (arguing that the
Incompatibility Clause has strengthened separation of powers and has prevented
the establishment of parliamentary government).
" See discussion supra notes 67-76 and accompanying text.
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ment, Senate trial, and possible removal of the President. s This process
may result in one or both legislative officers either becoming acting
president or moving one step closer to the presidency, potentially warping
their respective judgments when called upon to participate in the judicial
process of impeachment.79
In 1868, during the impeachment of President Andrew Johnson,
President Pro Tempore Ben Wade of Ohio was next in line to the presi-
dency and was selecting the members of his cabinet at the same time that
he was sitting as a juror and an active participant in Johnson's Senate
trial.8 Those "shenanigans" were a motivating force behind the 1886
amendment to the statute that established cabinet succession.8 Similar,
albeit more remote, concerns were raised in 1998 during the impeachment
of President Clinton. Speaker Newt Gingrich, in presiding over the House
debates and vote on impeachment (and himself voting for impeachment),
helped set in motion a process that could have moved him one step closer
to the presidency. Considered alongside persistent and ongoing calls for an
independent counsel to investigate (and perhaps bring about the impeach-
ment and removal of) Vice President Al Gore, the entire process had a
remote potential to place Gingrich in the White House.
The possibility of supplantation raises similar concerns of gamesman-
ship and manipulation. Imagine that the Secretary of State has become
acting president. The Speaker, the President Pro Tern, and the rest of
Congress could attempt to control and manipulate the acting president, on
threat of immediate and unilateral removal and replacement by the Speaker,
78 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5 ("The House of Representatives... shall
have the sole Power of Impeachment."); id. § 3, cl. 6 ("The Senate shall have the
sole Power to try all Impeachments.").
9 See Amar & Amar, Succession, supra note 21, at 122; A. Amar, Mandates,
supra note 29, at 385; Brown & Cinquegrana, supra note 1, at 1420; Calabresi,
Presidential Succession, supra note 50, at 156.
8 See Amar & Amar, Succession, supra note 21, at 123; A. Amar, Mandates,
supra note 29, at 385; Brown & Cinquegrana, supra note 1, at 1420. Johnson had
succeeded to the presidency upon the death of President Abraham Lincoln, and the
vice presidency remained vacant. See Amar & Amar, Succession, supra note 21,
at 123. Had Johnson been convicted and removed from office, it would have
created a double vacancy and triggered the application of the succession statute. In
1868, the original statute was in operation, meaning the President Pro Tern was to
become acting president. Id
" SeeAmar& Amar, Succession, supranote2l, at 134; Brown & Cinquegrana,
supra note 1, at 1420; Calabresi, Presidential Succession, supra note 50, at 167;
Truman, supra note 22, at 130.
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if the Secretary of State/acting president does not conform to the policy and
political wishes and will of Congress. Such threat of removal would
continue for the remainder of that presidential tenure, which, depending on
the circumstances, might be almost an entire four-year term. The result
would be an executive serving essentially at the pleasure of Congress,
subject to immediate removal and replacement at any time, without the
need to resort to ordinary impeachment procedures. 2 The acting president
would be forced to conform to Congress's policy preferences and to act
more in the interests of pleasing Congress (actually one member of
Congress) than in the public interest, under threat of immediate removal. 3
Such an executive will lack the independence, initiative, and vitality that
the Framers specifically sought to protect by limiting the legislative role in
the selection of the executive and the executive branch and that must be
protected in order for a system of separation of powers to function."
Cabinet officers already are members ofthe executive branch, selected
by the President to represent the same national electoral constituency and
to help the President exercise the executive power.' This gains particular
force under the theory of the unitary executive. Under Article II, § 1, the
whole of the constitutional executive power is vested exclusively in the
President." Cabinet officers have been hand-selected by the President to
' See Cinquegrana, supra note 3, at 127 (arguing that Framers did not want
executive's tenure in office to be dependent upon the sufferance of the legislature).
See also supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
" See Cinquegrana, supra note 3, at 119 (criticizing the "unbridled discretion"
that § 19 places in the hands of the congressional leadership and its effect on the
ability of the executive to act in the public, as opposed to congressional, interests);
id at 140 (arguing that the supplantation provisions "have no legitimate
relationship to the legislative functions of Congress" and that no lawmaking
purpose could be served by supplantation); see also id at 117-19 (discussing an
elaborate hypothetical in which the Speaker uses the underlying threat of
supplantation to compel the acting president to appoint an independent counsel to
investigate cabinet officers).
" See id at 139 ("The looming omnipresence of a congressional power to
supplant an Acting Presidentwould so clearly prevent the uninhibited performance
of those functions as to require no further elaboration."); see also discussion supra
notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
"' See Calabresi, Presidential Succession, supra note 50, at 173 (arguing that
senior cabinet officers represent the same constituency as President).
86See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 ("The executive Power shall be vested in
a President of the United States of America."); see also Fitzgerald, supra note 13,
at 756 ("Article II underscores its creation of a national constituency through its
means of apportionment: there is only one President for the entire nation.");
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exercise a specific delegated portion of that executive power, with the
President maintaining the ultimate power to select and to control the
conduct of her subordinates."7 Separation of powers, grounded as it is in
ensuring that the executive branch exclusively controls executive power,
dictates that the full executive power devolve to someone who, prior to
succession, exercised a delegated piece of that power under the control of
the President.
The Secretary of State, for example, has been exercising delegated
power over foreign policy, arguably the most important executive power
and the one in which the President, by design or practice, plays the most
central and exclusive role."8 This is the area in which the acting president
would be required to act most quickly and decisively upon taking office,
particularly in the face of a possible foreign crisis. The Secretary of State
also has an ongoing (and presumably good) working relationship with the
cabinet and the rest of the executive branch. This provides greater stability
and continuity in the transition and greater legitimacy for the acting
president, both within the executive branch and with the public.89
Lawson, supra note 66, at 1242 ("[T]hat power to execute the laws is vested, not
in the executive department of the national government, but in 'a President of the
United States of America.' ").
87 See Calabresi, Political Parties, supra note 16, at 1501 (arguing that the
President should be in charge of the entire executive branch); Calabresi & Rhodes,
supra note 9, at 1168 (arguing that the theory of the unitary executive commands
that the President must retain the authority to give directives to the officers who
assist him and to control that department); Lawson, supra note 66, at 1243 & n.72
(arguing that President retains power to issue detailed and binding instructions to
a cabinet secretary who has been given the power by Congress to promulgate
regulations in some area).
I SeeUnited States v. Curtiss-WrightExp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304,319-20 (1936)
(emphasizing the unique role that the President plays in the area of foreign policy);
Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign
Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231, 252-53 (2001) (arguing that the "President's executive
power includes a general power over foreign affairs," given the understanding that
foreign affairs power was included in the concept of executive power); see also
Michael A. Carrier, All Aboard the Congressional Fast Track: From Trade to
Beyond, 29 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 687, 689 (1996) (arguing that the
President's assumption of dominant foreign policy power has been more a matter
of practice than constitutional design).
89 See IRWIN UNGER & DEBI UNGER, LBJ: A LIFE 292 (1999) (discussing
Lyndon Johnson's decision to keep President Kennedy's advisers, congressional
liaisons, and cabinet secretaries when he ascended to the presidency in the interest
of continuity).
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As erroneous as Alexander Haig's declaration of control in March 1981
was, his ability to work inside the White House with other presidential
aides helped to control and organize executive branch action during the
early, uncertain crisis period after the President was shot.0 It is doubtful
that the Speaker would have been able to work as quickly, or as well,
within the White House and with White House staff.
Similarly, had the September 1I attack succeeded in killing or injuring
both President George W. Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary
of State Colin Powell would have been better able than Speaker of the
House Dennis Hastertto assume control of the executive branch, to oversee
American military and diplomatic responses to the attack, to address and
ease public concerns about national security, and to guide the nation
through the crisis. This flows from Powell's starting position as a high-
ranking member of the executive branch and a delegatee of executive
power and from the fact that he would be a leading voice in the military and
diplomatic actions in any event. Indeed, efforts immediately after the
Tuesday morning attack appeared to focus on moving cabinet members to
secure locations in order to ensure that the executive branch, through some
cabinet officer, would remain at the head of the federal government if the
attack succeeded against the President and Vice President.91
Unfortunately, Truman never mentioned separation of powers in
proposing the new statute, and Congress considered separation of powers
only from the standpoint of whether, under the Constitution, executive
power could devolve to a legislative officer. 2 No one addressed whether
it is a normatively good idea to devolve executive power to a legislative
officer, considering the nature and purpose of separation of powers as an
independent value. Had Congress so considered the principle, it should
have concluded that separation of powers supports succession by members
of the cabinet.
' See Allen, supra note 1, at 64-66 (describing the early period after the
assassination attempt on President Reagan, including concerns that it might have
been the work of the Soviets or some other foreign enemy, and the response of
Haig and other top advisers to the crisis).
9' See Meet the Press (NBC television broadcast, Sept. 16, 2001) (interview
with Vice President Richard Cheney, describing efforts to secure safety ofhimself
and the rest of the cabinet to ensure that the head was not cut off of the federal
government).
92 See Amar & Amar, Succession, supra note 21, at 134-35 (discussing
congressional debates over constitutionality of legislative succession); Brown &
Cinquegrana, supra note I, at 1424 (same).
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B. Political Partisanship
1. Political Partisanship Considered
a.
The Constitution of 1787 makes no mention of political parties; in fact,
by relying on separation of powers as the primary structural principle, the
Constitution arguably was "devised against part[ies]."93 Parties were
viewed as factions, as "personal and irresponsible clique[s]"94 acting
"contrary to the peace and safety of the people,"95 and were associated with
deep and unbridgeable differences in national politics, their instability
posing a danger to liberty.96
Madison provided the clearest explanation of this sentiment in The
Federalist No. 10, in which he warned against a government in which the
"public good is disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties, and that
measures are too often decided, not according to the rules ofjustice and the
rights of the minor party, but by the superior force of an interested and
overbearing majority."'97 The danger was that the spirit of party and faction
would become incorporated into the operation of government. The solution,
in Madison's view, was a republican government, in which the size and
scope of the national government would take in a "greater variety of parties
and interests," making it "less probable that a majority of the whole will
have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens."98
9 HOFSTADTER, supra note 16, at 70; see Calabresi, Political Parties, supra
note 16, at 1484 ("The Framers of our Constitution were quite outspoken in voicing
their dislike for 'factions' and 'parties."'); id at 1494 n.54 ("[T]he vast bulk of our
Constitution was designed to discourage parties and not to accommodate them.")
(emphasis omitted); Michael Allen Gillespie, Political Parties and the American
Founding, in AMERICANPOLITICALPARTIESANDCONSTITUTIONALPOLITICS, supra
note 16, at 17 (stating that the Constitution did not make provision for parties);
James L. Sundquist, The Question is Clear, and Party Government is the Answer,
30 WM. & MARY L. REv. 425, 425 (1989) (arguing that the Framers "originally
conceived a nonpartisan government" and "designed the Constitution to
deliberately obstruct and discourage the formation of national parties").
94 1 ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, HISTORY OF U.S. POLITCAL PARTIES, at xxxiv
(1973).
95 Id (quoting THOMAs HOBBES, LEvIATiAN 125 (Dutton 1965) (1651)).
961d
97THEFEDERALISTNO. 10, at 45 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
" See id at 51; see also HOFSTADTER, supra note 16, at 24-25 (discussing the
Madisonian view of parties as an unavoidable product of a free state); Calabresi,
Political Parties, supra note 16, at 1488 (describing support for Madisonian view
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But even if discouraged, parties are not constitutionally prohibited."
Indeed, one commentator has suggested that Madison did not condemn all
parties: he condemned those opposed to the rights of other citizens or to the
interests of the community but not those acting consistent with the
permanent interests of the community.°" In other words, where the partisan
conflict was between competing political groups striving to defend the
government each believed the Constitution had established, parties were
not inconsistent with or contrary to the facially anti-party Constitution.' °
Of course, this creates intractable definitional problems, because whether
a particular party is defending the Constitution or opposing the community
interests and the rights of other citizens depends entirely upon one's
perspective."
b.
Organized political parties developed almost immediately during
George Washington's first term, notably around divisions over Alexander
that parties were a source of trouble that could be controlled through a wisely con-
structed government and constitutional structure); see generally Larry D. Kramer,
Madison's.Audience, 112 HARv. L. REv. 611 (1999) (discussing Madison's theory
on parties and factions and the impact of that theory).
" See Mark V. Tushnet, The Constitution and the Nationalization ofAmerican
Politics, in A WORKABLE GOVERNMENT? THE CONSTITUTION AFTER 200 YEARS
166 (Burke Marshall ed., 1987) (arguing that the Supreme Court "has not found
any tension between the Constitution and the national party system"); see also
Charles R. Kesler, Political Parties, the Constitution, and the Future ofAmerican
Politics, in AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTIES AND CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS, supra
note 16, at 229 ("The United States Constitution is a partisan document. . ").
" See Gillespie, supra note 93, at 19-20 (arguing that Madison's "condem-
nation of faction is not a blanket condemnation of all parties," but only those
"opposed to the rights of other citizens or to the permanent and aggregate interest
of the community") (emphasis omitted); see also Lloyd N. Cutler, Now is the Time
for All Good Men.... 30 WM. & MARY L. REv. 387, 389 (1989) [hereinafter
Cutler, Now is the Time] (arguing that Madison's definition "would not appear to
cover a broadly based national political party that cuts across narrow interest
groups").
o' See Gillespie, supra note 93, at 43 (suggesting that, under Madison's view,
early parties were not fhctions because "they did not seek to undermine the rights
of their fellow citizens and did not aim at a goal that was adverse to the permanent
and aggregate interests of the community").
"o See id at 36 ("[E]ach group understood its own party organization to be
compatible with and indeed essential to the preservation of republican government,
while at the same time viewing the opposition party as a threat to the continued
existence of republicanism.").
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Hamilton's plans to assume state Revolutionary War debts and to create a
national bank, as well as around disagreements over the United States'
position with regard to the French Revolution. 3 Hamilton, as Washing-
ton's Treasury Secretary, sought to build support for these policies by
forging connections among like-minded members of Congress and between
Congress and the Treasury Department; Representative James Madison and
Secretary of State Jefferson countered with similar efforts to defeat these
plans." 4 Thus were the early parties born alongside these controversies,
even while George Washington, in his Farewell Address, warned against
the "baneful effects of the spirit of party generally.
10 5
Many have argued that the development of parties, unexpected though
it might have been, was necessary for the survival and success of the
American Constitution." This is particularly true in the context of
selection; the chief functions of the early political parties involved
organizing and coordinating electoral campaigns, establishing party
platforms and tickets, formulating positions, and arranging the government
to ensure implementation of a chosen agenda. 7 Most notably, political
103 See HOFSTADTER, supra note 16, at 87; id at 89 (quoting Jefferson's letter
of June 1793 to James Monroe, stating that the war in Europe "kindled and brought
forward the two parties with an ardour which our own interests merely, could never
excite"); Kramer, supra note 16, at 273 ("Parties grew alongside the escalating
series of political controversies .... ").
'0o See Kramer, supra note 16, at 274; see also Gillespie, supra note 93, at 39
(arguing that Jefferson organized the Republican party to counter "the threat to
republicanism that he perceived in Hamilton's plans").
'05 George Washington, Farewell Address, in 1 A COMPILATION OF THE
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THEPRESIDENTS 218 (James D. Richardson ed., 1901).
But see HOFSTADTER, supra note 16, at 91 (arguing that Washington's bipartisan
prestige was lost in his second administration and that he became a partisan of
Hamiltonian Federalism).
106 See HOFSTADTER, supra note 16, at 70 ("[lit seems doubtful whether this
Constitution... could have been made to work if such a functional agency as the
party had not sprung into the gap to remedy its chief remaining deficiencies.");
Mansfield, supra note 16, at 2 (arguing that parties "appear to be necessary parts
of the constitution in the informal sense"); Sundquist, supra note 93, at 426
(arguing that the Framers "found it absolutely necessary to concert the organs of
power that they had dispersed").
107 See Kramer, supra note 16, at 274 (arguing that, particularly after the
election of 1796, "fledgling party managers looked for ways to organize and
coordinate campaigns"); id at 273 (arguing that parties offered supporters a
national organization capable of formulating positions and managing campaigns);
Daniel Hays Lowenstein, Associational Rights of Major Political Parties: A
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parties made it possible for one candidate regularly to gain a majority in the
Electoral College and for the College successfully to select (rather than
simply nominate) a President by reducing the number of presidential
candidates and by creating broad supporting constituencies for those
candidates. 08
It is significant that the first structural change to the Constitution, the
first formal change in the procedures for selecting federal officials,
reflected the political partisanship principle. Under the original design of
the Electoral College, each elector cast two votes for President, with the top
vote-getter becoming President and the second vote-getter becoming Vice
President; it was envisioned that the two best candidates for President
would prevail and together form the executive branch."° In 1789 and 1792,
this worked well largely because George Washington was a candidate in
both elections and the Framers had expected him to be the only real choice
for the presidency." Most electors viewed Washington as the only
candidate for President and saw themselves as casting one vote for
Washington as President and a second vote for another candidate as Vice
President."'
By 1796, the first election without Washington, this system no longer
was effective, as there was no single clear choice for President. The formal
party structures and their practices began to play a role in the election, with
each party designating a preferred choice for each executive office and
instructing electors to vote accordingly." 2 This worked so well that in
Skeptical Inquiry, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1741, 1761 (1993) ("[P]olitical parties provide
a means by which the nearly infinite conceivable policy viewpoints are funneled
into a manageable number.").
108 See Casper, supra note 11, at 178 (arguing that the formation of political
parties helped redirect the Electoral College); Wechsler, supra note 5, at 553
(arguing that the rise of parties has enabled the Electoral College successfully to
select a President).
SSee KURODA, supra note 67, at 172; see also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3
(providing that the top vote-getter with a majority in the Electoral College would
be President and that the next vote-getter would be Vice President) (amended by
U.S. CONST. amend. XII).
"O See KURODA, supra note 67, at 57, 129.
"'See id at 129; see also HARDAWAY, supra note 14, at 91 (arguing that, with
Washington running in 1788 and 1792, the only office in contention was Vice
President).
11 See HARDAWAY, supra note 14, at 91 ("By 1796, however, it became
apparent that a party putting forth a candidate had a definite idea of which can-
didate it wanted for president and which candidate it wanted for vice president.");
KURODA, supra note 67, at 129 (arguing that, by 1796, many Americans thought
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neither of the next two elections was a party able to elect both a President
and Vice President of its choice through the ordinary Electoral College
process.
The election of 1796 produced a divided executive, as Federalist
presidential choice John Adams won the presidency, with Republican
presidential choice Thomas Jefferson finishing second in the voting and
becoming Vice President."' The Federalists, wanting to avoid a tie and to
ensure that Adams won the necessary electoral majority, ordered several
Federalist-committed electors to slough or withhold votes from Federalist
vice presidential choice Thomas Pinckney."4 However, the electors
sloughed too many votes, allowing Jefferson to finish second and to claim
the vice presidency." 5
In 1800, this process resulted in the election being thrown into the
House. Republican presidential choice Jefferson and vice presidential
choice Aaron Burr finished in a tie in the Electoral College, when party
officials ordered electors to vote straight forthe two Republican candidates,
rather than sloughing votes and renewing the risk of a split executive."' In
the House, Federalists threatened to invert the candidates, making Burr
President instead of Jefferson, despite the fact that Jefferson obviously was
the preferred, and more qualified, choice for President and that such a vote
would have gone against the expressed will of the public and of the
of separate votes for President and Vice President as the natural practice).
"' It perhaps is a mark of how much the system has evolved that in 1796,
Jefferson finished second in the presidential race and became President of the
Senate. Two hundred years later, in 1996, Robert Dole finished second in the
presidential race and became a spokesman for Viagra, Visa, and Pepsi, doing
commercials with singer Britney Spears.
114 See HARDAWAY, supra note 14, at 91; KURODA, supra note 67, at 65-71;
Akhil Reed Amar & Vik Amar, President Quayle?, 78 VA. L. REV. 913, 921
(1992) [hereinafter Amar & Amar, President Quayle?].
1 5 See HARDAWAY, supra note 14, at 91 (stating that "Federalists withheld too
many votes, and Jefferson slipped in as the vice president"); KURODA, supra note
67, at 70-71 (discussing Electoral College voting in 1796 election); Amar & Amar,
President Quayle?, supra note 114, at 921 (same); Beverly J. Ross & William
Josephson, The Electoral College and the Popular Vote, 12 J.L. & POL. 665, 676
(1996) (same); see also Amar & Amar, President Quayle?, supra note 114, at 922
(arguing that no move for amendment followed the 1796 election because many did
not see a divided executive as a concern).
1
6 See HARDAWAY, supra note 14, at 91; KURODA, supra note 67, at 99; Amar
& Amar, President Quayle?, supranote 114, at 922; Josephson & Ross, supranote
67, at 155 (arguing that Republicans were afraid of losing the vice presidency if
they sloughed votes).
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Republican party.'1 7 The contingency election finally required thirty-six
ballots, the influence of Hamilton, and enough Federalists abstaining (not
one Federalist voted for Jefferson in the House election) to permit state
delegations to make Jefferson President.'
The Twelfth Amendment followed. Ratified in 1804, it established
separate Electoral College ballots, with designated candidates for each
office and electors casting one vote for each office. 9 The risk of inversion,
as in 1800, was eliminated; avice presidential candidate would not become
President, nor would the runner-up presidential candidate become Vice
President. In fact, the Amars argue that eliminating the risk of inver-
sion-not eliminating the risk of a split executive-was the primary
motivation for the amendment.
20
For our purposes, the amendment recognized and accommodated the
existence of formal political parties, conforming formal constitutional
selection procedures to informal partisan practices and making these
practices the systemic norm.' 21 Party choices were to prevail, by ensuring
that the party winning a majority of votes in the Electoral College would
capture and control both executive offices.2
C.
American parties are not ideologically pure or consistent." They "are
not especially programmatic, which is to say they are more concerned with
11 See HARDAWAY, supra note 14, at 91; KURODA, supra note 67, at 100-01
(discussing Republican concerns that Federalists would invert the candidates and
make Burr President); Amar & Amar, President Quayle?, supra note 114, at 922.
"" See HARDAWAY, supra note 14, at 92; KURODA, supra note 67, at 104-05;
id. at 105 (noting that Jefferson became President in the House election without the
vote of a single Federalist and that Republicans would not forgive "spiteful"
Federalists).
"9 See U.S. CONST. amend. XII; see also HARDAWAY, supra note 14, at 92.
'
21 See Amar & Amar, President Quayle?, supra note 114, at 922-23 (empha-
sizing that it was the inversion problem, not the split executive, that was the
motivating force behind the Twelfth Amendment).
121 See KURODA, supra note 67, at 172 ("A national political party with an
organization capable of nominating presidential candidates and offering a program
and philosophy that attracted support across the country made archaic the
Constitution's provision for each elector to cast two votes for President."); Amar
& Amar, President Quayle?, supra note 114, at 923 ("In the end, then, the Twelfth
Amendment makes the Constitution safe for strong parties...."); Mansfield, supra
note 16, at 12 (arguing that the Twelfth Amendment gave unacknowledged but real
constitutional recognition to political parties).
2 ,See KURODA, supra note 67, at 172.
12 'See Lowenstein, supra note 107, at 1761 ("American parties are generally
regarded as among the least ideologically defined in the world... 2).
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getting people elected than with getting them elected for any specific
purpose."'24 American parties fall somewhere in the middle of Tocque-
ville's continuum of parties, which distinguishes great parties, devoted to
principles over consequences, from small parties, entirely or largely
without political faith."~ Parties do serve as rough proxies for ideology, or
at least for a commitment to some common set of public policies and
positions and loose combination of ideological and policy views.'26
Membership in a particular party labels an official as adhering to those
policies across the political branches of government.'27 However, what a
party stands for is broad and flexible enough to leave substantial room for
disagreement; when ideology and electoral success collide, the former
generally yields to the interests of winning.
2 1
This helps explain the prevalence of and preference for ticket-splitting
and divided federal government, with voters supporting Senators or
Representatives of one party and a President of another and changing party
support from election to election. 29 The major parties are so ideologically
broad that a single voter, voting as a member of three distinct electoral
constituencies, may support candidates from different parties in each of
those constituencies. Split tickets and divided government have, since
World War H, become the preferred choice of the voters.3 °
12" Kramer, supra note 16, at 278-79.
11 See 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 175 (George
Lawrence trans., J.P. Mayer ed., 1969).
'" See Lowenstein, supra note 107, at 1761 ("[T]he Democrats and
Republicans have always been associated with at least a loose clustering of
ideological and policy views."); see also Calabresi, Political Parties, supra note
16, at 1530 (arguing that parties serve as good predictors of legislative voting
behavior).
'
27 See Calabresi, Political Parties, supra note 16, at 1530 (discussing labeling
function of party membership); Lowenstein, supra note 107, at 1762 (arguing that
candidates have an incentive to associate themselves with the party label and to
make that label attractive to voters).
'28 See Kramer, supra note 16, at 279.
'29 See Calabresi & Larsen, supra note 34, at 1092 ("[O]ur Constitution allows
for divided party control of the Presidency and of Congress .... ."); Wilson, supra
note 55, at 23 (describing the increase in split-ticket voting).
'
30 See Amar & Amar, President Quayle?, supra note 114, at 915 (discussing
the "dramatic increase in ticket splitting generally by American voters over the last
fifty years" and the fact that, in 1984, voters in half of the congressional districts
supported House and presidential candidates of different parties); Calabresi,
Political Parties, supra note 16, at 1510 (describing the option of voting a split
ticket as the preference since the New Deal); Calabresi & Larsen, supra note 34,
at 1092 & n.239 (stating that from 1946 to 1992, different parties have controlled
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Party membership links candidates for different offices in the public
mind, to a candidate's advantage or disadvantage, and provides voters
with information about particular candidates for particular offices. A
congressional candidate's association with a popular (or unpopular)
President through the medium of party membership often will influence
and affect the outcome of the election in that House district.13' Voters
often express displeasure with the President by voting against members of
her party in House and Senate elections; the presidential party generally
loses congressional seats, and some policy influence, in midterm
elections.
32
However, the House, Senate, and executive remain distinct departments
chosen by distinct electoral constituencies: three different voices of the
People speaking through three different channels.3 1 The vote against
congressional candidates of the presidential party, while perhaps motivated
by the unpopularity of the President and the partisan connection between
the President and those congressional candidates, cannot necessarily be
read as a vote against the President or as an indication of the voters' actual
intention to remove the President or her party from the White House. It was
not the President's national constituency (or coalition of state constituen-
cies) that voted in the midterm election, but the smaller state and local
constituencies. Voters in these smaller constituencies may have been
motivated not by opposition to the sitting President as much as by a desire
Congress and the White House two-thirds of the time); Epstein, supra note 55, at
568 ("The fact that you observe (at least since 1950) a consistent set of
outcomes--here with divided government-suggests that this is what people in
general want."); Malbin, supra note 16, at 77-79 (discussing the increase in ticket-
splitting and divided government, with graphics showing the rise of ticket-splitting
from 1900 through 1988).
... See Calabresi, Political Parties, supra note 16, at 1528-29 (discussing the
advantages to a candidate of a link to a faithfil party agent and the disadvantage
of a link with a faithless party agent).
13 2 See Ceaser, supra note 55, at 186 ("[Although the president holds his term
for four years, a new sounding is taken every two years, and a president can lose
influence in policy matters if his party suffers a severe setback in the midterm
election."); Cutler, Now is the Time, supra note 100, at 401 ("[I]t is a political
truism that the President's party usually loses House and Senate seats in an off-year
election....').
113 See Calabresi & Larsen, supra note 34, at 1093 (describing the "complex and
highly sophisticated" three-tiered method for "sampling the national will" of the
people); see also discussion supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text.
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to have Congress, through control by a different party, provide some
partisan balance to the President' 34
The President may lose influence or the ability to push an agenda after
two years, but she does not lose the White House and neither does her
party. In 1996, two years after his Democratic Party lost control of both the
House and Senate, President Clinton was reelected with a forty-seven
percent national popular plurality in an election featuring three major
candidates and an Electoral College landslide.
d.
The development of political parties within the Constitution's
separation of powers structure has created a hybrid system, with partisan-
ship not overcoming separation of powers, but separation of powers not
eliminating parties from the system. 135 The party structures work within the
system of separation of powers, joining informally what the Constitution
separates formally.136 The President necessarily has policy allies in
Congress in the members of her own party.' A party able to control all of
"" See Calabresi, Political Parties, supra note 16, at 1510 (arguing that a
divided government allows voters to have, for example, a President committed to
shrinking the federal government and Congressmen committed to bringing home
pork projects).
135 See id at 1532 (arguing that political parties play a valuable role in the
separation of powers system); Wilson, supra note 55, at 19 ("The parties have not
overcome the separation of powers, at least to the degree critics of the separation
would like.").
"6 See HOFSTADTER, supra note 16, at 70-71 (arguing that parties became a
necessary part of the system of government and turned the Constitution into a
working instrument of government); Kesler, supra note 99, at 229 (arguing that
political parties bring coordination and organization to institutions that formally
were separated); Malbin, supra note 16, at 75 ("The parties... help[ ] to bring
some coordination to institutions that formally were separated."); Mansfield, supra
note 16, at 8 (arguing that political parties are "voluntary associations outside of
the Constitution that help to make it work as it does"); Wilson, supra note 55, at
18 (arguing for a "party system that can overcome the separation of powers by
bringing together under informal arrangements what the founders were at pains to
divide by formal ones").
' See Kesler, supra note 99, at 243 ("[P]arties multiplied presidential ties to
Congress, and probably strengthenedpresidential influence over policy-making.");
see also Cutler, Now is the Time, supra note 100, at 389 (arguing that the elected
President and elected congressmen of the same party have greater natural affinity
for cooperation with one another and this affinity offsets the "institutional
[VOL. 90
STRUCTURAL PRINCIPLES
the political branches of the federal government arguably will be better able
to enact the core policy agenda that won electoral approval, with the
President and a congressional majority committed to the same policies and
working together to achieve those policies.' Historically, a President is
more likely to get her policy agenda passed and more likely to be able to
take fast, effective action when she has a congressional majority.'39 Of
course, because those policies are so broad and diverse in these largely non-
ideological parties, it is possible that elected officials from the controlling
party still will not agree entirely as to what those policy priorities are."9'
Nothing guarantees that the President will have that legislative
majority, given the preference for ticket-splitting and divided
government.14' Commentators have argued forbroad constitutional changes
wariness" between the executive and legislative branches in the exercise of their
shared powers); Malbin, supra note 16, at 75 ("The parties work across the
branches of government.. . ."); Sundquist, supra note 93, at 426 (arguing that
political parties were the necessary organ to bring together the House, Senate, and
executive branch).
"' See Cutler, Now is the Time, supra note 100, at 398-99 (arguing that all the
acknowledged great Presidents have presided over unified governments in which
they have been able to pass their legislative agendas); Cutler, To Form a
Government, supra note 55, at 6 (arguing for the government to have the ability to
formulate and carry out an effective overall program, which is achieved when the
same party has a majority in both the executive and legislative branches); see also
Erwin Chemerinsky, The Question's Not Clear, But Party Government is Not the
Answer, 30 WM. &MARYL. REV. 411,414-15 (1989) (arguing that a party able to
control both the presidency and Congress will be able to enact its policies, which
might not be a good thing, depending on one's views of the party in control at a
given moment).
139 See Cutler, Now is the Time, supra note 100, at 398-99 (arguing that the
most successful Presidents had congressional majorities, with Ronald Reagan and
his 1981 tax cut being the lone exception); id at 396-97 (discussing the example
ofWoodrow Wilson and his loss of policy success after his party lost control of the
Senate in 1918); Cutler, To Form a Government, supra note 55, at 11 (arguing that
a system that makes divided government possible has succeeded only when some
unusual event has brought the country together and created substantial consensus,
such as war or the Great Depression); Sundquist, supra note 93, at 428 ("[T]he
Presidents in history whom we revere were the strong Presidents who were able to
get their programs accomplished through the instrument of party government.").
9' See Calabresi & Larsen, supra note 34, at 1103 (questioning the assumption
that unified party control will bring about more major legislative activity).
"' See Sundquist, supra note 93, at 427 ("Ticket splitting gave us divided
government .... ."); see also discussion supra notes 129-34 and accompanying
text.
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to establish pure party government in place of separation of powers,
guaranteeing that one party would control both political branches at a given
time and, presumably, would be better able to enact its policy agenda. 42
They argue that such a system would remedy the perceived weaknesses of
a separation of powers system by establishing governmental accountability
and by enabling the governmentto act more quickly and more forcefully.143
By contrast, others prefer divided government and its effect of preventing
a President from acting too singularly, dramatically, and forcefully."
The Framers originally were concerned with conflicts and rivalries
between the branches, particularly with the system's tendency towards
aggrandizement of the legislature over the executive.45 In the early period of
the nation, party rivalries centered around those questions of the structure and
power of government, with the Federalists and Republicans fighting over
arguably differing visions of the Constitution and the federal government'
14See Cutler, To Form a Government, supra note 55, at 13 (proposing numer-
ous constitutional changes, including elimination of the Incompatibility Clause).
' See Cutler, Now is the Time, supra note 100, at 398 ("A unified government
usually will be held accountable for its errors and omissions... at the next
election."); Cutler, To Form a Government, supra note 55, at 11-12 (arguing that
a President in a divided government cannot achieve his program, but the public
cannot fairly hold him accountable for that failure, because he does not have the
power to execute and legislate that program); Sundquist, supra note 93, at 426
(arguing that bringing about pure party government would bring back the original
political system).
' See Chemerinsky, supra note 138, at 414-15 ("In a country with deep
ideological divisions and no consensus... the best government may be one of
'muddling'-a government that acts by compromises, often incrementally rather
than dramatically."); Epstein, supra note 55, at 567 (arguing that there should be
a "strong presumption that the more legislation you have, the worse that
government works").
141 See THE FEDERALISTNO. 48, at 277 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) ("The legislative department is everywhere extending the sphere of its
activity and drawing all power into its impetuous vortex.").
146 Compare Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Melish (Jan. 13, 1813), in
THOMAS JEFFERSON, WRITINGS 1268, 1268-69 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984)
(suggesting that Hamilton and the Federalists favored an English monarchy and
wanted to establish such a system in the United States, using the Constitution only
as a stepping stone, while the "party called republican" was "steadily for the
support of the present constitution"), and id, Letter from Thomas Jefferson to
George Washington (May 23, 1792), 985, 988 (describing Republicans "who
espoused the same government for it's intrinsic merits"), with ALEXANDER
HAMILTON, An Address to the Electors of the State ofNew York (Mar. 21, 1801),
in SELECTED WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 465, 470
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This was a period that Tocqueville described as guided by "great political
parties."'47
Established parties and a stabilized federal system mean that the
parties, or at least the major parties, share a commitment to certain basic
constitutional principles and no longer contest the basic form or powers of
the government' Although policy disputes often are phrased in terms of
"big" as opposed to "small" government, or of returning power to the
states, parties generally argue not about broad structural constitutional
principles, but about the material political interests of the moment.' Rival
parties, as opposed to rival branches, now conflict with and check one
another, particularly when a different party controls each branch.,"
Conflicts between the branches-as between President Clinton and the
Republican-controlled Congress in the late 1990s or between President
Reagan and the Democrat-controlled Congress in the 1980s-properly
are viewed as partisan conflicts rather than as branch conflicts affecting
the basic form and power structure of government. Structural arguments
as to the power balance between the executive and legislative branches
and as to which branch should exercise which powers depend more on
which party controls a given branch at a given moment. As one commenta-
tor put it:
we have gazed at the spectacle, all the more ridiculous because the
partisans are so serious, of Republicans defending the powers of Congress
under the presidency of Franklin Roosevelt and the prerogatives of the
(Morton J. Frisch ed., 1985) (stating that the Antifederalists "have openly avowed
their attachment to the excessive principles of the French revolution"), and id at
478 (describing the split as a "contest between the tyranny ofjacobinism, which
confounds and levels every thing, and the mild reign of rational liberty").
47 See 1 DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 125, at 176-77 (arguing that there were
no signs of great political parties following the demise of the Federalists and the
rivalry with the Republicans).
'1 See Kesler, supra note 99, at 231 (arguing that "political parties have little
to say about the Constitution's relevance to their own functions").
'
49 See id ("It has been a long time, for example, since the G.O.P. objected to
a proposed new federal program not simply because it was spendthrift or
imprudent, but because it was unconstitutional.").
's See HOFSTADTER, supra note 16, at 81 (discussing Madison's argument,
during the second Washington Administration, for using parties to check one
another); see also Epstein, supra note 55, at 571 ("[V]oters have a greater
preference for divided government as a way to slow down the political jugger-
naut.").
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executive under Ronald Reagan, and of Democrats performing the same
acrobatic maneuver in reverse. 151
This is best illustrated in the frequent conflicts over Senate confirma-
tion of executive appointments and in the arguments about the responsibil-
ity of each branch in the appointment process. A Convention compromise
gave the Senate a role in executive appointments, creating a powerful but
silent check on favoritism in the exercise of the appointment power, but
leaving the ultimate choice with the President.' 52 Members of one party in
the Senate act differently (and expect the President to act differently)
depending on whether or not they are in party agreement with the President
and (presumably) with a particular nominee. Partisanship affects the
manner in which, and how rigorously, one party in the Senate exercises that
check and how much control the President ultimately has over her
appointments. 53
George Washington pointed to this very inconsistency in the execution
of constitutional functions, and the subsequent desire for political revenge,
as a problem with political partisanship.'54 Washington's concerns
encompassed the larger notion that the majority party ought to be hesitant
to run roughshod over the minority party, knowing that they "might very
soon find themselves in the minority and in danger of finding their ox being
gored."'
155
"' Mansfield, supra note 16, at 9.
12 Compare THE FEDERALIST No. 76, at 425 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961) (stating that Senate confirmation has a "powerful, though, in
general, a silent operation" serving as "an excellent check upon a spirit of
favoritism inthePresident"), with id No. 65, at 364 (AlexanderHamilton) (stating
that the executive is to be the principal agent in the appointment process); see also
discussion supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
'53 Cf PaulR. Verkuil, The Purposes andLimits ofIndependentAgencies, 1988
DuKE L.J. 257,260 n.9 (arguing that the defeat of Judge Robert Bork's nomination
to the Supreme Court either was a triumph of politics over reason or reason over
politics, depending on one's political outlook).
154 See Washington, Farewell Address, supra note 105, at 219 ("The alternate
domination of one faction over another, sharpened by the spirit of revenge natural
to party dissension,... is itself a frightful despotism.").
11 See Calabresi, Political Parties, supra note 16, at 1515. Such hesitancy has
not been the rule, however. See CARTER, supra note 64, at 129-31 (arguing that the
arguments, criticisms, and opposition that Thurgood Marshall faced from
Republicans to his nomination to the United States Supreme Court in 1967 were
similar to those that Robert Bork faced from Democrats in 1987).
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2. Political Partisanship and Succession
Partisanship and double-vacancy succession have a long and illustrious
history together. The original 1792 statute established legislative succes-
sion partly out of partisan motivations: the Federalist-controlled Congress
wanted to keep Republican Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson out of the
line of succession.156
Given the close link between partisanship and separation ofpowvers,
157
it follows that the partisanship problems with § 19 are similar to the
separation of powers problems. Only the motivation for congressional
action changes-from a grab for power in the name of aggrandizement of
the legislative branch at the expense of the executive, to a grab for power
in the name of partisan politics and the aggrandizement of one political
party at the expense of another. The problem with the current succession
order is not that the Speaker is next in line but that the Speaker may be, and
often is, of a different party than the President.
A recent example illustrates. When Democratic President Clinton nominated
attorney Bill Lan Lee as Assistant Attorney General in charge of Civil Rights,
Senate Republicans decried Lee's former role as a liberal "activist" attorney and
did not permit the nomination to be brought to a floor vote. They warned that Lee's
prior litigation positions suggested that he would try to expand the enforcement of
federal civil rights laws beyond their intended scope and that he would enforce not
the laws that Congress had written but the laws that he wanted or that fit his
personal preferences. However, when Republican President George W. Bush
nominated former Senator John Ashcroft, a conservative Republican, as Attorney
General, Senate Republicans spoke only of Ashcroft's commitment and duty as
Attorney General to enforce the laws as written, even those with which he
emphatically did not agree, against which he had voted and argued as a legislator,
and which he believed went too far. Yet no one explained why Lee would not have
been just as committed or felt just as duty-bound to enforce all laws as written.
Meanwhile, in opposing Ashcroft's nomination, Senate Democrats, no longer
in party agreement with the President, emphasized that the "advice and consent"
provision of the Constitution does not mean "advice and rubber stamp what the
President wants" but instead commands and requires them to take a close, hard
look at all nominees and nominations and to oppose vigorously those nominees
with whom they may disagree, such as Ashcroft. In other words, the change in
presidential administrations, and the consequent change in the role of each party's
Senate caucus, reversed the arguments each made in carrying out the confirmation
function. See id at 15 (stating that there is no consensus as to what "close scrutiny"
in the confirmation process involves).
156 See Amar & Amar, Succession, supra note 21, at 132; Brown &
Cinquegrana, supra note 1, at 1418.
7 See discussion supra notes 135-55 and accompanying text.
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The statute still creates conflicts of interests and negative incentives for
Congress. The supplantation provisions pose the same danger of games-
manship and manipulation of the acting president by a Speaker and the
same threats to the acting president's independence and vitality.' In fact,
because the rivalry between the two major political parties has become
more prominent than the rivalry between the two political branches, such
shenanigans will arise only where Congress and the White House are
controlled by different parties. It seems unlikely that a Republican
Congress would attempt to impeach a Republican President (at least in the
absence of true, serious public wrongdoing) or that a Democratic Speaker
would supplant, or threaten to supplant, a Democrat acting as President.
In addition, Congress's Twenty-Fifth Amendment responsibility to
confirm a nominee to fill a vice presidential vacancy' becomes entwined
with these partisan conflicts when succession passes through the Speaker.
A congressional majority of one party might delay confirmation of a vice
presidential nominee from the rival party because the Speaker remains next
in line for the presidency so long as the vice presidency remains vacant.
Commentators have suggested that the lengthy, five-month delay by the
Democrat-controlled Congress in confirming Republican Nelson
Rockefeller as President Ford's Vice President in 1974, after Ford had
ascended to the presidency, was linked to the House majority's desire to
keep then-Speaker Carl Albert, a Democrat, next in the line of succes-
sion.'"
The flipside is that the ordinary cabinet confirmation process during
divided government might become even more difficult or more contested
if the Senate is aware that it is confirming the person who also is to be third
in line to the presidency."" It might change the qualifications sought in
... See Cinquegrana, supra note 3, at 117-19 (presenting hypothetical of a
Democratic Speaker trying to force a Republican Secretary of State/acting president
to call for an independent counsel investigation or to sign a particular piece of
legislation or take some other executive action through threat ofsupplantation); see
also discussion supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
11" See U.S. CONsT. amend. XXV, § 2 ("Whenever there is a vacancy in the
office of the Vice President, the President shall nominate a Vice President who
shall take office upon confirmation by a majority vote of both Houses of
Congress.").
'60 See Amar & Amar, Succession, supra note 21, at 128; Calabresi, Presi-
dential Succession, supra note 50, at 167.
Cf Amar& Amar, Succession, supranote2l, at 131 (suggesting the creation
of a cabinet position of "First Secretary," who is to be the second presidential
successor and whose confirmation would take into account her specific role as
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cabinet nominees, with Presidents seeking to appoint cabinet officials with
higher national profiles who might have greater popular recognition and
support in the event one becomes acting president. Presidents also might
avoid appointing cabinet officers who are not constitutionally eligible to
assume the presidency."
In arguing for legislative-specifically Speaker-succession, President
Truman explicitly recognized and sought to accommodate the partisanship
principle. Truman understood that, while not ideologically pure, political
parties reflect a commitment to some set of policies and a connection
among candidates and voters sympathetic to those policies. 63 He believed,
correctly, that it was important that the same political party maintain
control of the White House in the event of a double vacancy and that any
succession scheme should ensure retention of party control.' If the voters
of the national electoral constituency place one party in the presidency, that
party should retain the presidency for the full four-year term; there should
not be a party change if and when § 19 is triggered.
Where Truman went wrong was in his belief that Speaker succession
was the way to ensure the continuation of party control. He argued that the
majority in the House of Representatives ordinarily was in party agreement
with the President, meaning the Speaker would be as well. As a result,
Speaker succession would enable the same party to maintain control of the
White House. He specifically contrasted this with succession by the
President Pro Tem, arguing that the Senate was more likely to have a
majority hostile to the President and was more likely to fill the White
House with someone not in sympathy with the former President's party
and, presumptively, with her policies and with the electoral will of the
people.
165
contingent successor to the presidency).
62 This might mean that a President will not appoint to the cabinet someone
who is not thirty-five years of age or who was not born in the United States. See
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5 ("No Person except a natural born Citizen... shall
be eligible to the Office of President; neither shall any Person be eligible to that
Office who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty five Years ... ."). For
example, both Henry Kissinger, who was Secretary of State to Presidents Nixon
and Ford, and Madeline Albright, who was Secretary of State to President Clinton,
were not born in the United States and neither would have been eligible to become
acting president had § 19 been triggered.
' See discussion supra notes 123-34 and accompanying text.
'64 See Truman, supra note 22, at 129-30.
'65See id at 129-30.
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Truman perhaps was correct to suggest that Speaker succession better
guarantees party continuity than succession by the President Pro Tern, but
it does not follow that Speaker succession guarantees party continuity
generally. For most of the fifty-plus years that § 19 has been in effect,
including all but nine of the last thirty-four years, Truman's assumption
about the House of Representatives has been wrong. Divided government
and ticket-splitting have, since World War II, become the norm rather than
the exception; having a President and a House majority (and Speaker) of
different parties is now commonplace.'" There almost always would have
been a change in party control of the White House had § 19 been invoked,
filling the White House with someone not in party sympathy with the
former President and not in sympathy with the electoral will expressed by
the President's national electoral constituency. As long as the legal and
constitutional possibility of divided government exists, § 19 creates the
risks of conflicts of interest, manipulation, gamesmanship, shenanigans,
and substantial changes in public policy that accompany the possible
change of party control in the executive.
Double-vacancy succession perhaps provides additional arguments for
those who would amend the Constitution to establish a system of pure party
government"'6 Eliminating divided government and guaranteeing that the
Speaker is a Democrat when the President and Vice President are Demo-
crats eliminates the risk of a party change and ensures that any acting
president will be, in partisan terms, a suitable successor. Unified govern-
ment also would eliminate partisan motivations for political gamesmanship
under the current version of § 19.
We perhaps could resolve the partisanship problems (but not the
substantial separation of powers problems) with legislative succession by
placing next in line the House and Senate leaders from the presidential
party, whatever legislative offices they may hold. In other words, the
Speaker or President Pro Tern would be next in line only when Congress
and the White House are controlled by the same party; otherwise, executive
power would devolve to the leader of the minority party caucus in the
House, then to the holder of that position in the Senate. The problem with
this solution is that only the Speaker and the President Pro Tern are
required legislative officers under the Constitution."8 There is no constitu-
'66 See supra notes 129-34.
,67 See discussion supra notes 142-44 and accompanying text.
'
68 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, el. 5 ("The House of Representatives shall chuse
their Speaker and other Officers.... ."); id § 3, cl. 5 ("The Senate shall chuse their
other Officers, and also a President pro tempore....").
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tional requirement that there be formal party caucuses or Minority Leaders,
and either house may, at any time, unilaterally eliminate such a position
through its power to establish its own rules of operation.169 We should be
hesitant to place in the statutory line of presidential succession (which is
established through Bicameralism and Presentment) a legislative officer
whose office is not required or guaranteed by the Constitution and whose
office may be eliminated by the singular act of one house without
concurrence of the other house or the executive.
The better way to ensure the important structural goal of keeping the
White House in the same party hands is to re-establish cabinet succession.
Cabinet officers generally will be of the same political party as the
President. It is natural that the President, in selecting cabinet officers to
whom to delegate a portion of the executive power, will choose people who
are in party and policy agreement with her. There generally would be no
change in party control of the White House if the Secretary of State ascends
to the presidency.
Even if the President selects cabinet officers from a different party in
order to create a more ideologically and politically diverse and inclusive
administration, she likely will select people from the rival party who are in
substantial policy agreement with her. Regardless of party, cabinet officers
likely are committed to the same agenda as the former President and likely
will continue to pursue that agenda after succession. This perhaps is an
advantage of the ideological breadth and non-programmatic nature of
American parties-there is more likely to be some agreement across the
aisle, such that a President may appoint cabinet members from the opposite
party and a change in party control might not mean a radical policy change.
For example, had William Cohen, a Republican serving as Secretary of
Defense during the second Clinton administration, succeeded under § 19,
there is no reason to believe that he would have departed dramatically from
Clinton's policy agenda, particularly with regard to military and foreign
affairs. But Cohen, regardless of party affiliation, was Clinton's hand-
picked policy subordinate, chosen because of his agreement with and
commitment to a policy agenda. It is far less likely that a Republican
Speaker such as Newt Gingrich would have been in substantial policy
agreement with a Democratic former President such as Clinton, suggesting
that substantial policy change is more likely under legislative succession.
The import of maintaining party control of the White House does not
change because the President's party lost seats (and even a legislative
' See id § 5, cl. 2 ("Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings
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majority) in a mid-term election. That election was an act of the smaller
local and state congressional constituencies, rather than the President's
national constituency, and neither the President nor her party lost control
of the executive branch.' The vote should not be read as a decision to
change the party in control of that branch or as the voters' desire to change
the party in control of that branch. The President and her party perhaps lost
influence and some control over the policy agenda but did not lose the
White House. The party therefore should not lose the White House in the
event of a double vacancy and the triggering of the succession statute.
Considered individually, political partisanship demands succession by
members of the cabinet, rather than succession by a member of Congress.
Taken together, partisanship and separation of powers overwhelmingly
support a switch to cabinet succession.
C. Democracy
1. Democracy Considered
Democracy refers to the role of the People in choosing officials and in
making political decisions.' 7' Democracy in the selection process can be
direct, meaning the federal office holder is chosen by the People, or
indirect, meaning the federal office holder is chosen by some individuals,
such as state legislators or presidential electors, who themselves have been
chosen by the People. The original emphasis was on indirect democracy;
direct democracy has increased in import as the federal government has
evolved.
From a modem perspective, the Constitution "started out with an
incredibly undemocratic electoral process."" 2 The People were the ultimate
sovereign under the Constitution and were the legitimate source of power
from whom the Constitutional charter was derived and with whom all
power ultimately resided."n The support of a current majority was
"I See discussion supra notes 131-34 and accompanying text.
.. See McWilliams, supra note 15, at 79 ("Democracy is inseparable from
democratic ways of framing and arguing for political choices.").
72Mikva, supra note 18, at 797.
73 See THE FEDERALIST No. 49, at 281-82 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961) ("[T]he people are the only legitimate fountain of power, and it is from
them that the constitutional charter, under which the several branches of
government hold their power, is derived .... "); see also Berns, supra note 18, at
62 (stating that all Framers agreed that the source of legitimate government was the
People); Ceaser, supra note 55, at 174 (stating that the power to form the basic
charter of government "lies, in a primitive sense, with the body of the people");
Fitzgerald, supra note 13, at 725 (arguing that the "politically active People... are
themselves the single 'absolute and perpetual sovereign' within their political
perceived as necessary for the effective functioning of the government. 74
At the same time, most decisions as to the selection of federal office
holders were out of popular hands; the sense of the People was to be neither
close to the actual officer selected nor particularly frequent.75 The
Constitution was designed to provide "constitutional space," a distance
between the government and the People. 76 That space ordered democracy's
passions and rationalized its expressions where policymaking was
concerned. 77 That space necessarily would serve the same purpose where
selection is concerned.
Direct democratic selection was limited underthe original Constitution,
with the House of Representatives being the only department in the federal
government chosen by direct popular election.7 7 Even where there was
direct democracy, its scope and extent were limited. In elections for the
House, the states controlled voter qualifications, often with restrictive and
exclusionary rules that could and did vary from state to state. 17 9 The
national electorate in 1787 comprised only about twenty percent of the
population, as most states limited the franchise to white male property
owners.8 The states also controlled congressional districting, with no
universe"); Hardin, supra note 57, at 93 ("[T]he people have been held to be the
source of law.").
'74 See THE FEDERALIST No. 49, at 281-82 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961).
175 See id at 284.
76 See Mansfield, supra note 16, at 14-15; see also Josephson & Ross, supra
note 67, at 152 (discussing the Framers' arguments as to the need for a layer
between the People and government decision-making); Ross & Josephson, supra
note 115, at 676 (same).
' See Fitzgerald, supra note 13, at 734; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at
49 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (arguing that a republican,
representative form of government is preferable to democracy in controlling
factions and passion).
178 See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 1; THE FEDERALIST No. 52, at 295 (James
Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (arguing that the House should have
immediate dependence on and sympathy with the People through frequent
elections); see also Mikva, supra note 18, at 797 (arguing that the original system
was undemocratic because the People could choose only the House of
Representatives); Wechsler, supra note 5, at 546 ("[Tjhe House was meant to be
the 'grand depository of the democratic principle of the government .... .")
(quoting George Mason in the Convention, 5 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 136 (1876)).
'71 See Mikva, supra note 18, at 797; Neuborne, supra note 15, at 1592-93;
Wechsler, supra note 5, at 549.
"0 See Mikva, supra note 18, at 797; see also Neubome, supra note 15, at 1593
(arguing that conceptions of suffrage were extremely limited in 1787); Wechsler,
supra note 5, at 549 (describing problems of state contraction of the electorate).
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constitutional guidelines other than that every state have at least one
Representative and that the number of Representatives not exceed one for
every 30,000 people.' This made possible great discrepancies in district
size.1
2
The remainder of the federal government was subject only to indirect
democracy, through which the People chose the individuals who in turn
chose federal office holders. The Senate was chosen by the state legislatures
themselves."u The President was elected by presidential electors chosen
specifically and only for the purpose of selecting that office.' The manner
of choosing electors was controlled and directed entirely by the legislature of
each state; 5 it could include popular selection but need not do so."
181 See U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (establishing initial House representation,
setting a maximum number ofrepresentatives based on population, establishing an
initial level ofrepresentation from each state, and providing that each state should
have at least one representative).
182 See Wechsler, supra note 5, at 550-51 (noting earlier "great discrepancies
in district size").
'83See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, cl.
1; THE FEDERALIST No. 62, at 345 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(arguing that state selection of senators provided for select appointments and gave
the state governments a significant agency in the federal government); see also
Bybee, supra note 19, at 511-12 (discussing two competing views of the rationale
for state selection of the Senate, including the need to give power to the upper
classes of society).
' See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XII; see
also THE FEDERALIST No. 68, at 380 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) (arguing that selection of the executive should be left to "men chosen by the
people for the special purpose, and at the particular conjuncture"); id. ("A small
number of persons, selected by their fellow-citizens from the general mass, will be
most likely to possess the information and discernment requisite to so complicated
an investigation.").
' See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, cl. 2 ("Each State shall appoint, in such Manner
as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors... ."); Bush v. Gore,
531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000) (per curiam) ("[T]he State legislature's powerto select the
manner for appointing electors is plenary... ."); McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S.
1, 29 (1892) ("No question was raised as to the power of the State to appoint, in
any mode its legislature saw fit to adopt, and none that a single method, applicable
without exception, must be pursued in the absence of an amendment to the
Constitution."); see also Josephson & Ross, supra note 67, at 166 (arguing that the
legislative power to select the manner of appointment of electors is plenary and
exclusive).
16 See KURODA, supra note 67, at 15; see also Bush, 531 U.S. at 104 (providing
that the "individual citizen has no federal constitutional right to vote for electors
for the President of the United States unless and until the state legislature chooses
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Several members ofthe Constitutional Convention, notably Gouvemeur
Morris, Robert Morris, James Wilson, and James Madison, advocated
direct national popular election of the President. 8 ' Such proposals were
rejected, based on a fear of direct democracy and a preference for
democracy largely remaining indirect.' Many of the Framers feared that
direct national democracy, through national popular election, was
unworkable, given the size and scope of the national government and the
presumed lack of available information about the character and qualifica-
tions of candidates that would enable voters to make educated choices.8 9
Some questioned whether a majority could agree on any single candidate
for President on the assumption that only two Americans, George
Washington and Benjamin Franklin, had sufficient national reputations to
gain majority support." Others thought direct popular election would give
the President too much power.'
It generally is agreed, at the same time, that the system has become
more democratic as it has evolved. The historical trend has been the
shrinking of constitutional space, the encroachment of the People on
selection processes, and the enhancement of direct (rather than indirect)
a statewide election as the means to implement its power to appoint members of the
Electoral College").
1 See HARDAWAY, supra note 14, at 81 (stating that Robert Morris and,
initially, Madison proposedpopular election); KURODA, supra note 67, at9 (stating
that the most nationalistic members favored direct national election); JACK N.
RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE
CONSTITUTION 259 (1996) (stating that Morris's proposal for direct election was
supported by Wilson and Madison).
8 See HARDAWAY, supra note 14, at 75 (quoting Elbridge Gerry as stating that
"the evils we experience flow from the excess of democracy"); id at 13 (stating
that the proposal for popular election was the one most soundly defeated at the
Convention).
8 9 See KURODA, supra note 67, at 9 (stating that opponents of direct election
suggested that a national election might produce disturbances and riots that
would destabilize "the republican experiment"); RAKOVE, supra note 187, at 259
(stating that popular election was rejected because the nation was too large to
make itworkable); Mikva, supranote 18, at 796 (discussing the Framers' concerns
"that the people lacked sufficient knowledge of the character and qualifications
of possible candidates to make an intelligent choice"); Ross & Josephson, supra
note 115, at 676 (discussing arguments of Elbridge Gerry against direct election
based on concerns that the People would be uninformed and unable to judge
candidates).
"o See KURODA, supra note 67, at 9.
19 See Althouse, supra note 72, at 995.
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democracy in selection."9 As one commentator stated, "all the constitu-
tional space was created at America's Founding," and "ever since it has
been gradually encroached upon and taken away.""' The democratizing of
the system, the creation of what Akhil Amar called a "modem national
democratic ethos,"'94 can be seen in several developments.
The first involved formal changes to the constitutional structure, mainly
through the Article V amendment process. The most obvious change is the
Seventeenth Amendment, which established direct popular election of
Senators.195 This change specifically reflected a preference for direct
democracy and democratic selection and the People's willingness to
shoulder any loss of constitutional federalism in exchange for greater
democracy.9
Similarly, a series of amendments expanded the franchise, establishing
a broad, uniform national electorate. The Constitution now guarantees the
franchise to ethnic and racial minorities, women, and eighteen-year-olds 1 7
192 See Berns, supra note 18, at 59 ("The Constitution is more democratic today
than in the past and promising (or threatening) to become still more democratic.');
Mansfield, supra note 16, at 14 (describing the "long-term, uninterrupted trend
toward democratization"); McWilliams, supra note 15, at 79 ("Most Americans
would agree that the Constitution has become more democratic with time.');
Mikva, supra note 18, at 797 ("We have progressed from those undemocratic
beginnings."); Shane, supra note 18, at 548 (describing "the plain democratic
trajectory of constitutional development since 1868").
193 Mansfield, supra note 16, at 15.
194Akhil Reed AmarA ConstitutionalAccident Waiting to Happen, 12 CONST.
COMMENT. 143, 145 (1995) [hereinafter A. AmarAccident]; A. Amar, Mandates,
supra note 29, at 391.
'95SeeU.S. CONST. amend. XVII, cl. 1, amendingU.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1;
see also Bybee, supra note 19, at 567-68 (suggesting that the amendment gave the
People control over their Senators in the sense of participation in popular elections
every six years).
"9 See V. Amar, Indirect Effects, supra note 17, at 1354 (arguing that the
Seventeenth Amendment was part of a "broad, albeit imperfectly orchestrated,
movement toward popular control"); id at 1403 ("[Tie the extent that election by
state legislatures was intended to produce 'better' men in the Senate, the
Seventeenth Amendment reflected a reversal in this thinking."); Bybee, supra note
19, at 538 (arguing that the people who supported the amendment "simply
preferred democracy to representation and were willing to shoulder the loss to
constitutional federalism").
197 See U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 (providing that the right to vote may not
be denied on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude); id. at
amend. XIX (providing that the right to vote may not be denied on account of sex);
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and prohibits poll taxes in elections for federal offices. 9 ' In addition, states
voluntarily eliminated property ownership requirements.' The result is an
electorate comprising more than seventy-five percent of the population.' °
Moreover, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
commands equal representation for equal numbers of people in the House
of Representatives, requiring that House districts be apportioned to achieve
population equality.20 ' While the states retain some power to control House
districting and voter qualifications, these constitutional changes have
limited state discretion in the name of broader popular inclusion in the
selection process.
The second development has been the extension of individual civil
liberties, as the expansive interpretation and application of the Bill of
Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment has come to be associated with, and
viewed as a necessary aspect of, a democratic society.2° This is especially
true for the First Amendment freedom of expression, which in purpose,
id. at amend. XXVI (guaranteeing the vote to citizens who are eighteen years of age
or older); see also Mikva, supra note 18, at 797 (describing expansion of the
franchise); Neubome, supra note 15, at 1594-95 (same); Shane, supra note 18, at
548-49 (describing "the plain democratic trajectory of constitutional development
since 1868").
' See U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV, § 1 (providing that the right to vote in
elections for federal offices shall not be abridged or denied "by reason of fhilure
to pay any poll tax or other tax").
199 See Mikva, supra note 18, at 798.
2" See id ("[W]e have come as close to universal suffrage as any country in
world history."); Neubome, supra note 15, at 1595 ("iWihatever the failings of the
body of the 1787 Constitution, the complete modem text, as amended, is suffused
with a normative vision of democracy that... guarantees all members of the polity
the equal right to participate effectively in the processes of self-governance.").
201 See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 730 (1982) (requiring that House
districts "achieve population equality 'as nearly as is practicable"') (quoting
Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 18 (1964)); see also Tushnet, supra note 99, at
156 ("The Court has enforced a rule of strict equality of population in
apportionment for the House of Representatives.").
202 See Morton Horwitz & Orlando do Campo, When and How the Supreme
Court FoundDemocracy--A Computer Study, 14 QUINNIPIAC L. REv. 1,29 (1994)
("The central role of democracy in American constitutional law accounts for the
surge in the Supreme Court's use of democracy in the last fifty years."); Neubome,
supra note 15, at 1592 (arguing that the "constitutional text reveals a normative
vision of democracy"); id at 1593-94 (arguing thatthe amendment process, notably
the passage and interpretation of the Bill of Rights, helped flesh out a normative
conception of democracy in the Constitution).
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function, and operation is linked to democracy and to the effective
operation of a democratic political system. 20 3 One commentator has argued
that the very order in which the several rights are enumerated in the text of
the First Amendment "mirrors the life cycle of a democratic idea, moving
from the interior recesses of individual conscience, to discussion and
collective action, and culminating in the formal give and take of politics."20
6
The Court and commentators have shown particular solicitude for speech
relating to the electoral and political processes, given the import and
necessity of such speech to the operation of a democratic system of
government.2 5
The third development has been the establishment, however informally,
of the populist presidency. As Steven Calabresi has argued, the President
is viewed as a nationwide popularly elected official, representing a distinct,
openly national, majority electoral constituency. 6 The President runs on
203 See MARTIN H. REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: A CRiTICAL ANALYSIS
21-22 (1984) (arguing that democracy and free expression foster the same values
and that free expression must be broadly protected in any democratic political
system); Edmond Cahn, JusticeBlackand FirstAmendment "Absolutes ":A Public
Interview, 37 N.Y.U. L. REv. 549, 559 (1962) (interview with Justice Black)
(Justice Black agreeingthat abasicpurpose oftheFirstAmendmentwas protection
for political speech); Alexander Meiklejohn, The FirstAmendment is an Absolute,
1961 Sup. CT. REv. 245, 259 (arguing that speech that has no relation to the
business of governing is unprotected by the First Amendment).204Neubome, supra note 15, at 1594; see U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right
of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress
of grievances.").
205 See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 346 (1995)
("[D]ebate on the qualifications of candidates are integral to the operation of the
system of government established by our Constitution."); Mills v. Alabama, 384
U.S. 214,218-19 (1966) (holding that protection ofthe First Amendment includes
discussions of candidates, structures and forms of government, the manner in
which government is operated or should be operated, and all such matters relating
to political processes); see also REDISH, supra note 203, at 22 (emphasizing the
importance of protecting speech to aid in making political judgments); Meiklejohn,
supra note 203, at 255 (arguing that the First Amendment protects the freedom of
activities of thought and communication by which we govern, particularly in
casting a ballot).
206 See Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments, supra note 60, at 59 (arguing
that the President is accountable to a national voting electorate and no one else);
Calabresi, Political Parties, supra note 16, at 1508 ("The President is electorally
responsible to the nation as a whole."); Calabresi, Presidential Succession, supra
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a national agenda and is national in her electoral and policy outlook. 7 As
Herbert Wechsler put it, the President has become "the main repository of
'national spirit' in the central government."2°
It is true, of course, that the President formally is selected according to the
mechanisms of the Electoral College, regardless of the outcome of the
nationwide popular vote.2 And as the Supreme Court put it most bluntly,
there is no federal constitutional right for the People to vote even for
electors,10 much less to vote for President. The Electoral College process is
widely criticized as undemocratic and anachronistic.2 " Such criticisms
certainly will increase in the wake of the 2000 election, in which President
George W. Bush lostthe nationwide popular vote by more than 500,000 votes
and received 271 electoral votes, one more than needed to prevail, and only
after the confused and contested popular election in the state of Florida and
the controversial decision ofthe United States Supreme Courtto haltrecounts
in that state.2 12
note 50, at 172 ("[T]he President and the Vice President are the representatives of
a distinct national majority electoral coalition."); Calabresi & Larsen, supra note
34, at 1093 (discussing the President's (and Vice President's) national
constituency); see also Fitzgerald, supra note 13, at 754 (arguing that the President
is "politically dependent on a national People").
207 See Wechsler, supra note 5, at 552 (arguing that the President presents
programs that reflect the needs of the entire nation, thereby balancing the localism
of Congress).
20S Id at 557-58.
209 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2-3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
210 See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000) (per curiam) (stating that the
"individual citizen has no federal constitutional right to vote for electors for the
President of the United States unless and until the state legislature chooses a
statewide election as the means to implement its power to appoint members of the
Electoral College").
211 See A. Amar, Accident, supra note 194, at 143 ("Our system of selecting
Presidents is a constitutional accident waiting to happen."); A. Amar, Mandates,
supra note 29, at 390 (arguing that none of the arguments for the Electoral College
works today); Mikva, supra note 18, at 795 (arguing that the Constitution sought
to protect presidential selection from direct democracy and majority votes); Victor
Williams & Alison M. Macdonald, Rethinking Article II, Section I and its Twelfth
Amendment Restatement: Challenging Our Nation's Malapportione4 Undemo-
cratic Presidential Election Systems, 77 MARQ. L. REv. 201, 203-04 (1994)
(discussing "the nation's significantly malapportioned electoral college system").
212 See Bush, 531 U.S. at 100-04 (discussing legal challenges to the outcome of
the popular vote in the state of Florida and attempts to order recounts of votes in
several counties); Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70,73-76
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Sub'constitutional developments in the actual operation oftheElectoral
College have created a selection system in which the President, in practice,
is popularly elected, albeit on a state-by-state, as opposed to truly nation-
wide, basis.2 3 All of the states have adopted, pursuant to their constitu-
tional discretion, popular election as the means of choosing presidential
electors, furthering the democratic principle.2"4 Ballots generally list the
names of the presidential and vice presidential candidates, not the names
of the electors who will cast the true votes for President; a vote cast for a
designated presidential (and vice presidential) candidate is deemed a vote
for that party's slate of nominees to the Electoral College.
215
States also retain the power to control (or permit control of) how
electors actually cast their presidential votes; electors in more than half the
states, once chosen, are obligated to vote consistently with the results of the
state's popular vote.216 States generally do this either by requiring electors
to vote for the presidential candidate of the party that appointed her or by
(2001) (per curiam) (same). Forcommentary on the Supreme Court's decisions and
the 2000 presidential election, see generally SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., WHEN
ELECTIONS Go BAD: THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY AND THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
OF 2000 (2001); RICHARD A. POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK: THE 2000
ELECTION, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE COURTS (2001).
2 3 See A. Amar, Accident, supra note 194, at 144 (arguing that direct election
is our de facto scheme today); Casper, supra note 11, at 178 (arguing that the
Electoral College has been redirected into a mechanism for the popular election of
the President).
214 See Bush, 531 U.S. at 104 ("History has now favored the voter, and in each
of the several States the citizens themselves vote for Presidential electors.");
McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 32-33 (1892) (stating that after 1832, the
electors in all states, except South Carolina, were chosen by general ticket popular
vote); HARDAWAY, supra note 14, at 148 (stating that, with a few exceptions, all
of the states by the 1830s had provided for appointment of electors by popular
election); Amar & Amar, President Quayle?, supra note 114, at 919 (stating that
by the 1820s popular elections to choose presidential electors were commonplace);
Josephson & Ross, supra note 67, at 160-61 (stating that all states provide for a
popular vote for electors, with all but two providing that all electors go to the
winner of the plurality of the statewide popular vote).
211 See Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214,229 (1952) (stating that states allow a vote
for the presidential candidate of the national party to be counted as a vote for his
party's nominees for the electoral college); Amar & Amar, President Quayle?,
supra note 114, at 925-26 & n.51 (stating that the names of electors are generally
not printed on the ballot).
216 See Amar & Amar, President Quayle?, supra note 114, at 919; Ross &
Josephson, supra note 115, at 690.
[VOL. 90
STRUCTURAL PRINCIPLES
permitting the parties to obtain pledges from each elector to vote for her
party's candidate."' This reduces or eliminates the likelihood of a faithless
elector voting for a candidate other than the one to whom she committed
and who won the popular vote in that state.
218
The perception of individual voters is that they cast a popular vote for
President and that the President will be the winner of a popular plurality;
the Electoral College is merely the "shadowy institution" that ratifies the
popular choice.2 19 After the Bush-Gore election, in which the winner of the
national popular election did not, in fact, win the presidency, this percep-
tion has been destroyed on the national level.
That perception remains accurate when viewed on a state-by-state
basis. We may better understand the President's electoral constituency less
as a national constituency than as a coalition of state electoral constituen-
cies, weighted according to each state's congressional representation,
including its population. " A candidate for President stands for election
before all of these state electorates simultaneously, putting forward a
nationwide agenda. In practice, the winner of a plurality of the popular vote
in a given state will win all of the electoral votes from that state. The
winner of a plurality of the popular votes of some coalition of states
totaling one more than half of the electoral votes, based on total congressio-
nal representation, will become President.
In other words, the President must win a weighted majority of state
popular elections. Putting aside the obvious procedural problems and
confusion in the 2000 presidential election in Florida, George W. Bush,
who stood as a candidate in all fifty-one jurisdictions, did just that. He was
27 See Ross & Josephson, supra note 115, at 690-91 & nn.132-34 (describing
three different ways of requiring electors to vote for candidate of one party); see
also Ray, 343 U.S. at231 (upholding state law permitting a party to obtain a pledge
from electors as to how they will cast their votes).
2"" See Berns, supra note 18, at 59 ("[E]xcept for an occasional maverick eager
to call attention to himself at no cost to anyone else, [electors] have long since
given up their nominal independence."); see also HARDAWAY, supra note 14, at
147 (stating that only seven such unfaithful votes have been cast in the past 150
years).
219 See Calabresi, Presidential Succession, supra note 50, at 171; Tushnet,
supra note 99, at 149 (arguing that the Electoral College "rapidly became merely
the forum for ratifying the voters' choice").
220 See HARDAWAY, supra note 14, at 13 (arguing that the Electoral College
establishes majority support through the conduit of the states); Althouse, supra
note 72, at 1012 (arguing that the People understand that they vote in "fifty-one
concurrent elections that would be aggregated").
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the declared winner of popular elections in thirty states, with a weight of
271 electoral votes-a majority; the Electoral College vote reflected the
weighted outcome of those thirty popular elections?"
One possible change to the procedures for selecting the President,
suggested first by Thomas Jefferson in 1801 and later by Andrew Jackson
in 1829, would formally establish the current informal system. It would
eliminate electors and choose the President directly through fifty-one
concurrent statewide popular elections; the winner of the popular vote in
each state automatically would receive a number of "votes" equal to that
state's total congressional representation, and the President would be the
winner of a majority (the same majority of 270 votes as in the current
system) of those votes.?' This procedure truly could be described as
weighted state-by-state popular election, the goal of which isto win popular
pluralities in the right coalition or aggregation of states. The difference is
the elimination of the electors, the Electoral College, and the special, secret
Electoral College vote that creates the undemocratic quality of the current
procedure. ' The intermediary would be eliminated from the selection
procedure-the constitutional space further reduced.24
This plan most obviously eliminates the risk of a faithless elector not
voting for the candidate to whom she has pledged and guarantees that the
outcome as expressed in the statewide popular vote will be reflected in that
state's electoral vote.'m The faithless elector is a rarity, however, given that
most states now significantly cabin or eliminate any real elector
discretion2 26 Otherwise, this new procedure does not substantially alter the
2 Whether or not Bush in fact did win, or should have been declared the
winner of, the popular election in Florida is beyond the scope of this Article.
' See Andrew Jackson, First Annual Message to Congress, Dec. 8, 1829, in
THE STATESMANSHIP OF ANDREW JACKSON AS TOLD IN HIS WRITINGS AND
SPEECHES 43-44 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909) (arguing for establishing
popular election, but with each state retaining its relative power and influence); see
also HARDAWAY, supra note 14, at 147-48 (describing the "Automatic Plan" for
choosing the President, in which the actual office of elector would be eliminated
and electoral votes automatically would be awarded as under the current system);
Althouse, supra note 72, at 994 & n.3 (same).
' See Mikva, supra note 18, at 799 (arguing that the Electoral College is
undemocratic "because it is secret").
224 See Mansfield, supra note 16, at 15 (describing the reduction of
"constitutional space" between the People and elected officials as the system has
developed).
221 See HARDAWAY, supra note 14, at 147.
.26See discussion supra notes 216-19 and accompanying text.
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way in which the President is selected.2" It also will be unsatisfying to
those who want a truly nationally elected President and who object to any
procedure that potentially might elect a President who did not win at least
a plurality of a straight nationwide popular vote.P Assuming, however,
that a constitutional amendment establishing a true nationwide popular
election is politically unlikely even after the 2000 election,' Jackson's
procedure should have some appeal after the 2000 election, because
removing electors and the Electoral College from the mix would eliminate
some of the troubling issues that arose in the Florida election.
First, this procedure eliminates the partisan gamesmanship of the
Florida legislature, which, in the midst of the contests, recounts, and
lawsuits, initiated proceedings to appoint its own slate of electors,
committed to Republican George W. Bush, the preferred candidate of the
legislative majority and of Florida Governor Jeb Bush, George Bush's
brother."0 That appointment would have been made without regard to the
ultimate result of the state's popular vote and before that ultimate result
even had been determined upon completion of the recounts.
'7 See HARDAWAY, supra note 14, at 147 ("[lIt is the very modesty of this plan
that makes it unlikely to be adopted."); Althouse, supra note 72, at 1011
(discussing the argument that the faithless elector problem is too "minuscule" to
warrant a constitutional amendment).
" A. Amar, Accident, supra note 194, at 145 (discussing concern for the
"dreaded specter of a clear popular loser becoming the electoral college winner").
But see Althouse, supra note 72, at 1012 (arguing that the loss of the national
popular vote by the electoral vote winner is the result ofthe "decision to campaign
efficiently under the requirements of the electoral college plan," such as by not
culling for extra votes in states the candidate is certain either to win or to lose).
m See HARDAWAY, supra note 14, at 163 (discussing past failures to amend the
Constitution to establish direct election); Wechsler, supra note 5, at 554
("Whatever may be said in principle for simple popular election, it would so
diminish the political importance of the states of small electorates that it has no
hope of adoption."); id at 558 (suggesting that the mode of presidential selection,
while national, should also make the President responsive to local values). But see
A. Amar, Accident, supra note 194, at 144 (arguing that direct election has been
made possible, given the changes in the political system and the nation); see also
Althouse, supra note 72, at 993 & n.2 (describing a joint resolution before
Congress calling for a Constitutional amendment to establish direct nationwide
popular election, with a runoff between the top two vote-getters twenty-one days
later if no candidate receives a forty percent plurality).
"3o See Shane, supra note 18, at 549. These legislative efforts ceased following
the Supreme Court's second Bush decision and after Albert Gore conceded the
election. See id
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There perhaps is a question of whether the Florida legislature had the
constitutional power to change, mid-election, the manner of appointing
electors from popular selection to legislative appointment. The Constitution
gives the states plenary power to determine the manner of appointing
electors"3 and nothing suggests any limitation on that power, including any
limitation on the time or context in which a legislature may determine or
change that manner of appointment. While the Fourteenth Amendment
does establish the constitutional principle of "one person, one vote,
232
the principle means only that, where there is an established right to vote
for a particular office, every voter must have an equal number of votes
and an equal electoral voice. 3 However, the Fourteenth Amendment does
not affirmatively create a right to vote for President or for presidential
electors, nor does it limit the power of a state to grant, not grant, or
withdraw such a right. The Supreme Court did not discuss this aspect of the
election controversy in Bush, but it unquestionably was aware of the
legislature's actions. Moreover, the majority's absolute language-the State
"can take back the power to appoint electors"- 4 -suggests that the Court
would have approved of such a mid-stream change in the manner of
appointment.
It perhaps could be argued that the establishment of the democratic
ethos, the expanded franchise, and the rights of individual voters in the
modem constitutional order should constrain the power of a state legisla-
ture to deny the People a voice in choosing presidential electors, as the
Florida legislature attempted to do. However, this is an argument, albeit an
accurate one, from the democratic principle and from what the state
legislature should do. It does not go to what the states may do as a matter
of constitutional power. Had the Florida legislature followed through on its
plan, such action would have been undemocratic, entirely inconsistent with
231 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (providing that each state legislature may
determine the manner of appointing electors).
22 See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964) (discussing the Equal
Protection Clause's requirement of one person, one vote).
3 See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104-05 (2000) (per curiam) ("Having once
granted the right to vote on equal terms, the State may not.., value one person's
vote over that of another."); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elecs., 383 U.S. 663, 665
(1966) ("[O]nce the franchise is granted to the electorate, lines may not be drawn
which are inconsistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.").
" Bush, 531 U.S. at 104; see also McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 35 (1892)
("[Tihere is no doubt of the right of the legislature to resume the power at any time,
for it can neither be taken away nor abdicated.").
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the independent principle of democracy-but it would have been constitu-
tional?. 5
Under a system of true weighted state-by-state popular election, only
the will of the People of each state, as expressed in the statewide popular
vote certified by the state in a largely ministerial act, based on a popular
election permitted to run to its conclusion, is determinative. There would
be no electors for the state legislature to appoint and no opportunity for the
legislature to end-run the popular vote and put forward its own preferred
slate of electors. The state's role would be identical to its role in House and
Senate elections: controlling the manner of running the election, establish-
ing procedural mechanisms for supervising voters, and counting (and
recounting) votes, without power ever to dictate or influence the
outcome.236
Second, removing electors eliminates the need for the multiple early
deadlines for the naming and meeting of electors and for the counting of
electoral votes on which the Supreme Court relied in halting all recounts in
the 2000 Florida presidential election? 7 There would be no meeting date
for electors; 8 there would be no need for the "safe harbor" provision that
makes a slate of electors conclusive if certified by a particular date; 9 and
there would be no need for procedures by which Congress could contest
particular electoral votes.24 The new system could rely on a single
date-perhaps on or about January 5, when the new Congress convenes,
'5 But see Shane, supra note 18, at 549 ("It is unthinkable, against this history
of constitutional development, that a state legislature should still be deemed
authorized to usurp the people's role in choosing presidential electors.").
26 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 ("The Times, Places and Manner of holding
Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the
Legislature thereof .... ."); Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510, 525-26 (2001) (striking
down a state provision that was not a procedural mechanism, but rather an attempt
to dictate electoral outcomes).
217 See Bush, 531 U.S. at 110 (holding that a constitutionally consistentrecount
could not be performed without substantial work prior to the December 12th date
for conclusive selection of electors that had been incorporated into state law); id
at 121-22 (Rehnquist C.J., concurring) (stating that a recount would jeopardize the
state "legislative wish" to take advantage of the safe harbor of 3 U.S.C. § 5).
2's See 3 U.S.C. § 7 (1994) (providing that electors meet on the Monday after
the second Wednesday in December following their appointment).
2'9 See id. § 5 (providing that if electors are chosen by established state
procedures at least six days before the time for the meeting of the electors, that
slate and its votes are conclusive).
240 See id §§ 15-18.
2001-20021
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
two weeks prior to the January 20 Inauguration24-by which each state
must certify and send to Congress the results of its popular election.
This allows ample time, almost two months, for challenges, contests,
and recounts of the popular votes, in accordance with state laws and
procedures, without the need for shorter dates that could halt any recounts
or vote-counting procedures. The determination of the popular winner
would be a question of state law determined according to the ordinary
workings of state legislation and judicial decisionmaking,242 subject to
Equal Protection and other constitutional limitations on the voting process;
Congress would be required to accept the certification from each state.
Had this selection procedure been in place during the 2000 election, the
Supreme Court's decision in Bush on December 12 that a uniform recount
procedure was necessary to avoid equal protection concerns would not have
ended the election.243 There would have been no December 12 safe harbor
deadline on which the Court would rely. Rather, Florida would have had
approximately one additional month to correct any constitutional problems
in the recount procedures, to carry out the recount, and to permit the
election process to conclude and produce a popular winner, who automati-
cally would have received the state's 25 electoral votes.
2. Democracy and Succession
The democratic principle is the only possible basis to support the
current version of § 19.2' It was the explicit focus of President Truman and
Congress. In Truman's view, the presidency should be filled by an elective
241 See U.S. CoNsT. amend. XX, § 1.
242 SeeBush, 513 U.S. at 123-24 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that state law
relating to presidential elections includes judicial review of legislative actions
under the state constitution).
243 See id at 533 (holding that a recount could not be conducted in compliance
with constitutional requirements without additional work, but that such election
could not be carried out within the time frames of the safe-harbor provision of 3
U.S.C. § 5 incorporated into Florida law). Butsee id. at 545 (Souter, J., dissenting)
("I see no warrant for this Court to assume that Florida could not possibly comply
with this requirement before the date set for the meeting of electors, December
18."); id at 558 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing for "permitting the Florida recount
to continue under uniform standards").
244 See Calabresi, Presidential Succession, supra note 50, at 174 ("[D]esire for
a democratically elected President is the only good argument for placing legislative
officers in the line of presidential succession.").
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officer, someone who has stood for popular election at some level.245 He
believed that the Speaker could best be said to stem from the People since
she stands for election every two years as a member of the House of
Representatives and is placed in the speakership by a majority of the
members of the House, themselves similarly elected.2' Truman relied on
the common notion of the House of Representatives as the most democratic
branch of the federal government, having the most immediate dependence
and intimate sympathy with the People.247 Therefore, he concluded that the
leader of the House should be the acting president in the emergency that
would create a double vacancy and trigger operation of the statute.
Congress agreed, although with some debate as to whether the House or
Senate was the more democratic house of the legislative branch.248
Closer examination shows that calling Speaker succession the most
democratic approach elevates form over substance. First, the Constitution
does not, in fact, require that the Speaker of the House actually be an
elected member of that body. 49 Common practice is that she is; each House
party caucus nominates and votes for its leader as Speaker and whichever
party holds the majority will place its leader in the speakership. However,
any arguments as to the democratic quality of the Speaker as potential
presidential successor hinge on an assumption that is not constitutionally
mandated.
On a national level, it is counter-intuitive to call a member of the House
of Representatives the most democratic official, given the relatively small
number of people who comprise the constituency that selects an individual
Representative. Members of Congress represent state and local constituen-
cies; they run on local concerns and programs and with a more local
electoral focus, emphasizing what they can and will do for that state and
245 See Truman, supra note 22, at 129.
246 See id
247 See THE FEDERALIST No. 52, at 295 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) ("l]t is particularly essential that the [House] should have an immediate
dependence on, and an intimate sympathy with, the people."); Wechsler, supranote
5, at 546.
248 See Brown & Cinquegrana, supra note 1, at 1427-28 ("The Senate agreed
with President Truman's argument that it was better to place elected officials,
rather than appointed Cabinet members, at the head of the line of succession."); id
at 1429-30 (describing Senate debates on this point).
249 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5 (providing only that the "House of
Representatives shall chuse their Speaker," with no details as to qualifications); see
also Brown & Cinquegrana, supra note 1, at 1429 (discussing congressional
comments over Truman's bill that made this point).
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that district and how they can protect these local interests in Congress.250
In choosing individual candidates in House districts, voters likely do not
consider what their vote will do for party balance in the House or Senate or
how it affects who becomes Speaker or President Pro Tem. The support of
the Vermont voters for Senator Jim Jeffords's defection from the Republi-
can Party in June 2001 illustrates the point. Jeffords's decision to become
an independent, with its consequent transfer of Senate control to the
Democrats,"1 met with general approval from his constituents, with polls
showing that sixty-five percent of Vermont voters supported his switch.
This suggests that those who voted for Jeffords when he ran for his Senate
seat as a Republican were not particularly focused on his party affiliation
or on which party would control the Senate and who would be President
Pro Tern (and in the line of presidential succession).
This perhaps was not true during the Newt Gingrich era from 1994-
1998, when Gingrich, as Republican Speaker of the House, arguably was
on voters' minds in every House race. Voters in each congressional district
were aware that Gingrich would be Speaker should the Republicans control
the House and that fact was a focal issue in many of these elections.
However, Gingrich in many ways was atrue parliamentary-style opposition
leader to President Clinton, a shadow President leading the party out of
executive power, representing his own national constituency, and promot-
ing his own national policy agenda mirroring that of the President.
2'0 See Amar & Amar, Succession, supra note 21, at 130 (discussing the
"narrow, local strategies by which Congressmen secure election in their states and
districts, with promises ofpork and parks"); Calabresi, PoliticalParties, supranote
16, at 1507 (arguing that Senators represent states and Representatives represent
single-membergeographic districts); Calabresi, PresidentialSuccession, supra note
50, at 172 (describing "congressional devotion to state and local interests");
Fitzgerald, supra note 13, at 749 (arguing that Senate members focus on state
interests and House members focus more on local interests); see also discussion
supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text.
2' At the beginning of the 107th Congress in January 2001, the Senate was
evenly divided between the two major parties; Republican Vice President Dick
Cheney cast the deciding organizational vote in making the Republicans the
majority party in that house. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 4 (providing that the
Vice President is President of the Senate and votes in the event of a tie). In
becoming an independent, Jeffords threw his support behind the Democratic
leadership for organizational purposes, giving the Democrats a 51-49 advantage
and making Sen. Tom Daschle (S.D.) the Majority Leader and Sen. Robert Byrd
(W. Va.) PresidentPro Tem. See generally JAMESM. JEFFORDS, MYDEcLARATIoN
OF INDEPENDENCE (2001).
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The same cannot be said for Dennis Hastert, the Republican Speaker
during the last two years of the Clinton presidency, nor for Tip O'Neill
when he was Democratic Speaker during the Reagan presidency (although
it arguably was more true for O'Neill than for Hastert). The point is even
less valid with regard to succession by the President Pro Tern, who
generally is not the leader of the Senate majority caucus and does not
control either the Senate's legislative agenda or the party's agenda--that
power rests with the Majority Leader, pursuant to Senate practice. The
President Pro Tem merely is the senior-most member of the majority party.
It is unlikely that individual voters in Senate elections in 2000 gave any real
consideration to whether Republican Strom Thurmond or Democrat Robert
Byrd would be President Pro Tem as a result of their vote in that individual
race.
This contrasts with the development of the populist presidency and the
view of the President as a nationally and popularly elected official
representing a national constituency (or at least a coalition of a weighted
majority of state constituencies). 2 Even a "national minority" President
such as George W. Bush stood for election in all fifty-one voting jurisdic-
tions, ran with a national policy and electoral agenda, received more than
fifty million votes nationwide, and won a weighted majority of state
popular elections, indicating some broad national public support. Voters
know that the President will appoint cabinet and other executive officers to
help her carry out the executive power, in fact, speculation as to whom a
candidate might appoint to key executive branch positions often is an issue
during the election and is used to evaluate that candidate. Cabinet officers,
having been hand-selected by the President to help execute the national
policy agenda that won national electoral approval, can be said to represent
that same national electoral constituency."
Both the Speaker and members of the cabinet gain their nationwide
democratic legitimacy from the same source: approval by one house of
Congress. The Speaker is placed in that legislative office by a majority of
the House of Representatives (usually along a straight party-line vote), a
point Truman emphasized in arguing for speaker succession. 2 4 Cabinet
2See discussion supra notes 206-21 and accompanying text
2 See Calabresi, Presidential Succession, supra note 50, at 173 ("[S]enior
members of the President's cabinet represent the same electoral coalition that put
him into office....").
24 See Truman, supra note 22, at 129 ("The Speaker of the House of
Representatives, who is elected in his own district, is also elected to be the
presiding officer of the House by a vote of all the Representatives of all the people
of the country.").
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officers must be confirmed by a majority of the Senate, a vote less along
party lines, more deferential to the President and the nominee, and
suggesting broader support within Congress.' s Given that the House and
Senate both are popularly elected, these approval procedures, although by
different houses representing somewhat different constituencies, are
functionally equivalent.
The difference between the Speaker and the Secretary of State is how
each one came before that house of Congress for approval. The Speaker
(assuming that the practice continues that she be a member of the House)
is elected by a majority of the voters in her district to represent their
interests in the House. The Secretary of State (and the rest of the cabinet)
did not stand for election and never received any popular votes from any
constituency, but was appointed to serve by the President, who was elected
by that nationwide coalition of state voters.
Ultimately, the difference between the Speaker and Secretary of State
is approximately 188,000 votes in one congressional district. That is the
number of votes, representing seventy-five percent of the total cast in the
district, that Speaker Dennis Hastert received from his congressional
district in Illinois in November 2000. It is difficult to argue that 188,000
votes in one of 43 5 congressional districts makes the Speaker significantly
more democratic on a national level, for purposes of presidential succes-
sion, than the hand-picked policy subordinate of a President who stood for
popular election in all fifty-one jurisdictions and won a weighted majority
of those statewide races.
Consider again September 11 and suppose that the terrorists had
succeeded in killing both President Bush and Vice President Cheney.
Secretary of State Powell would have been more knowledgeable of the
military and international landscape and better able to lead and guide the
ensuing military, political, and diplomatic action (with which he was
involved in any event). Moreover, given Powell's national reputation and
his position as the President's hand-picked foreign policy architect, he
would have been better able to reassure and lead the People and the nation
through the ensuing crisis.
Powell would have enjoyed great nationwide public confidence and
support in this role, likely more than would Speaker Hastert or any
2ss See THE FEDERALIST NO. 76, at 425 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961) (emphasizing Senate power of confirmation as a check upon a spirit of
favoritism and a source of stability in administration); Calabresi, Presidential
Succession, supra note 50, at 173 (arguing that Senate confirmation primarily
protects against extremism in executive appointments); see also discussion supra
notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
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individual member of Congress. This would be due, in part, to the uniquely
high national profile and reputation that Powell would bring to the table as
a viable presidential candidate in his own right; this is something that most
cabinet officers will not necessarily possess. However, this public support
also derives from the connection between Powell and the nationally
popularly elected President-the "apostolic legitimacy" that Powell retains
by virtue of his appointment by the duly elected President to assist in
representing the national constituency of the People. 6 The nation would
be better able to rally behind a successor specifically chosen by the populist
President than behind the ordinary, individual Congressman, chosen by the
voters of one district, who has risen to the top of the party's legislative
caucus.
In support of the new § 19, Truman suggested that it would be
inconsistent with the democratic principle for the President to appoint his
own successor, as Truman was doing in nominating George Marshall as
Secretary of State in 1945." This argument falls for two reasons.
First, as a practical matter, the President already appoints an immediate
potential successor by hand-selecting a running mate, the person who will
be Vice President, immediate successor, and heir apparent-the person who
will be the proverbial "one heart beat away" from the presidency. In fact,
the choice of running mate often is regarded as a presidential candidate's
first decision and a first test of her decision making abilities.
It is true that the Vice President is, in some sense, elected, campaigning
as part of the ticket with the presidential candidate and receiving Electoral
College votes cast specifically for that office. 5 8 Under state electoral laws,
however, voters cast ballots for a slate of electors pledged to a complete
party ticket of President and Vice President. 9 A voter cannot split her
executive branch ticket, cannot vote for a presidential candidate (or electors
committed to the presidential candidate) of one party and vice presidential
candidate (or electors committed) of another, even if she would prefer to
vote that way.2 There is no separate popular vote or individual decision
for Vice President; a vote for a presidential candidate is an automatic vote
' See Amar & Amar, Succession, supra note 21, at 131.
7 See Truman, supra note 22, at 129; see also discussion supra notes 42-47
and accompanying text.
" See U.S. CONST. amend. XII (providing for the casting of distinct Electoral
College ballots for Vice President).
See Amar & Amar, President Quayle?, supra note 114, at 925.
OSee id at 926; see also id at 916 (stating that in 1988, many voters would
have preferred to vote for Republican presidential candidate George H.W. Bush
and Democratic vice presidential candidate Lloyd Bentsen).
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for that candidate's chosen running mate. The real popular decision is for
the President; the chosen running mate and hand-picked successor
necessarily comes along with the President, just as appointed cabinet
officers come along with the President.
Moreover, the same electors who vote for President also vote for Vice
President, and they are committed and bound to vote for a particular party
for both offices. 6' There is virtually no chance of an elector splitting her
ticket and voting for a vice presidential candidate different than the one
hand-selected by the presidential candidate for whom that elector already
voted.
Second, to the extent Truman's argument about the undemocratic
quality of appointing one's own successor ever was correct, it no longer is
in the wake of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. 62 Ratified in 1967, twenty
years after the passage of § 19, the Amendment gives the President the
express constitutional power to appoint, with approval by both houses of
Congress, a new Vice President to fill a vacancy in that office.2" In other
words, the Constitution now recognizes the legitimacy of the President
appointing her own potential successor. If it is legitimate for an executive
to appoint, with congressional approval, her immediate successor in the
Vice President, it is equally legitimate and appropriate for a cabinet officer,
who would be a more remote potential successor.
At some level there is no difference between a hand-picked Vice
President and a hand-picked cabinet officer. The modem Vice President is,
in practice, an additional member of the President's cabinet, selected for
that postjust as is the Secretary of State, to help the President carry out the
executive power."' Cabinet succession "simply extends this modem model
of handpicked succession to the next level of contingency.2 65
The constitutional legitimacy of the presidential appointment power
imparts democratic legitimacy on officials appointed pursuant to that
261 See discussion supra notes 216-18 and accompanying text.
262 For a discussion of the connections and inconsistencies between the Twenty-
Fifth Amendment and § 19, see generally Brown & Cinquegrana, supra note 1.
263 See U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 2 ("Whenever there is a vacancy in the
office of the Vice President, the President shall nominate a Vice President who
shall take office upon confirmation by a majority vote of both Houses of
Congress.").
264 See Manning, supra note 50, at 148 ("Nowadays, we think of the Vice
President as the President's hand-picked running mate and a member of the
President's Administration.").
265 Amar & Amar, Succession, supra note 21, at 131; see id (suggesting the
possibility of the special cabinet position of "First Secretary," nominated and
confirmed expressly as a contingent successor).
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power. There were no real concerns about democratic legitimacy in Richard
Nixon's appointment of Gerald Ford as Vice President in 1973, in Ford's
succession to the presidency upon Nixon's resignation in 1974, or in
President Ford's appointment of Nelson Rockefeller as Vice President in
1974. The fact that both appointments followed orderly constitutional
processes ensured, at least for a time, the democratic legitimacy of both
officials.2 The same should hold true for a cabinet officer pressed into the
presidency in the (unlikely and tragic) event of a double vacancy.
Section 19 is, at worst, a wash where the democratic principle is
concerned. Under a more substantive focus on the electoral constituency
actually represented, a cabinet officer, the hand-picked representative of the
same national constituency and national policy agenda as the President, is
the more democratic choice to become acting president. On the other hand,
some may prefer to emphasize the procedural fact of having an acting
president who stood for popular election at some level, which concededly
has some inherent value. Perhaps this makes legislative succession
somewhat more democratic.
However, it is not so much more democratic, in an overall balance, to
overcome the substantial political partisanship and separation of powers
problems.26 Even if the democratic principle individually favors legislative
succession in this situation, the balance of the three structural principles
still supports cabinet succession as the more consistent approach.
D. Accommodating Three Principles
Because cabinet succession is most consistent with both separation of
powers and political partisanship, and arguably with democracy, § 19
should be amended to provide that a cabinet officer become acting
president in the event of a double vacancy. However, additional accommo-
dations should be made to the democratic principle. Any statute passed
under Article 11, Section 1, Clause 6 will, after all, place in the White
House someone who never stood for election before the national constitu-
2 We could speculate as to how far this legitimacy would go. Had the 1975
assassination attempt on President Ford succeeded, Rockefeller would have
become President and would have had the power to appoint a new Vice President.
Query the perceived democratic legitimacy of a Vice President appointed by
Rockefeller, a President who had succeeded to the office after being appointed
Vice President by Ford, a President who himself had succeeded to the presidency
after being appointed Vice President by President Nixon, who had been forced to
resign from office.
' 7 See discussion supra notes 77-92, 156-70 and accompanying text.
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ency (or before all fifty-one state constituencies) and never won such an
election. This specific succeeding officer likely was not on the minds of the
individual voters when they cast their votes for any federal office,
regardless of whether she had been a member of Congress or the cabinet
prior to succession.
The best way to satisfy the democratic principle is to re-establish, as in
the original succession statute, procedures for a special election to choose
a new President and new Vice President, under established regular
Constitutional procedures.2 This limits the amount of time under an acting
president and provides a President duly and constitutionally elected by the
regular national constituency. The chosen President will be better able to
establish her own programs and forcefully lead the executive branch,
whereas an acting president might see herself more as a custodian of the
former President's administration following succession and less able to
establish her own agenda.! 9
The President chosen in the special election would serve out only the
remainder of the existing presidential term, and the next regular quadren-
nial presidential election should be held as scheduled. The pattern of
federal elections-in which a President is elected every four years and the
entire House and one-third of the Senate is elected every two years-is
important to the partisan and democratic flow of the political system. The
pattern enables voters to consider legislative and executive candidates
together every fouryears and to express their approval or disapproval of the
President's performance every two years by voting for or against congres-
sional candidates of her party."' It also enables voters to express their
desire to keep each party in check by splitting tickets and establishing
divided government.27" This pattern should remain intact beyond the
"' See Calabresi, PresidentialSuccession, supra note 50, at 174 ("Te best way
to satisfy this democratic concern is, forthrightly, by providing for special
presidential elections."); see also A. Amar, Mandates, supra note 29, at 384-85
(emphasizing the importance of the special election provision of the original statute
and the need to re-establish that aspect of the succession law).269 Cf UNGER & UNGER, supra note 89, at 291 (stating that Lyndon Johnson
viewed himself as "trustee and custodian" of the Kennedy administration when he
first became President and that it took him time to establish his own program).
270 See Ceaser, supra note 55, at 186 ("[A]though the president holds his
term for four years, a new sounding is taken every two years, and a president
can lose influence in policy matters if his party suffers a severe setback in the
midterm election."); see also discussion supra notes 131-34 and accompanying
text.2 See discussion supra notes 129-44 and accompanying text.
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immediate emergency creating the double vacancy and triggering the
statute.
272
There is some question as to how quickly this election could or should
occur, particularly in the wake of the national tragedy and international
crisis that likely created the double vacancy. Commentators suggest
anywhere from two to seven months.' Seven months, and perhaps as long
as one year, seems more plausible. One cannot imagine gearing up for, and
carrying out, a presidential election within sixty days of a September11-
type terrorist attack that had killed both the President and Vice President.
The longer period seems a more realistic time frame in which to stabilize
the federal government under the acting president, stabilize the nation, calm
and reassure the People of some sense of security, and jump-start the
electoral machinery. A special election then becomes unnecessary if one
year or less remains on the existing presidential term, since the wheels of
the regular quadrennial election are in motion.274 The special election also
could be held as part of regularly scheduled mid-term elections, if the
vacancy occurred during amid-term election year and that electoral process
already is moving forward.275
It could be argued that the special election provision renders the acting
president a lame duck, limited to a term of only about six to twelve months,
such that she would be unable to deal with any immediate crises, particu-
larly in foreign and military affairs. However, any succession statute
necessarily seeks a balance among numerous possible scenarios. Holding
a special election is more consistent with the democratic principle, in that
a President (as opposed to an acting president) will be elected as quickly as
possible and someone not elected or ascended to the presidency under the
2 See Calabresi & Larsen, supra note 34, at 1093 (describing the "complex and
highly sophisticated" three-tiered method for sampling the national will of the
people).
2 Compare Amar & Amar, Succession, supra note 21, at 138 n.144 (arguing
that, allowing time for grieving and campaigning, such an election could not be
held for six or seven months), with Calabresi, Presidential Succession, supra note
50, at 174 (arguing for a special election within sixty days).274 Compare Amar & Amar, Succession, supra note 21, at 138 n.144 (arguing
that, because the special election could not take place for six months, an acting
president should complete the existing term if eighteen months or less remains),
with Calabresi, Presidential Succession, supra note 50, at 174 (arguing for a
special election whenever one year or more remains on the term).
275 See Truman, supra note 22, at 130 (suggesting that election for President
after double vacancy should be held either during the next congressional election
or in special election).
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Constitution will not occupy the White House for a long period of time.
Moreover, any concerns for immediate action in foreign policy crises may
be addressed by having the Secretary of State or Secretary of Defense, the
cabinet officers most familiar and involved with foreign policy, become
acting president and serve until the special election chooses a new
President.
September 11 illustrates the import of a special election provision in
furthering the democratic principle. The Bush administration was less than
one year old on September 11. An acting president (Speaker Hastert under
the current statute)--someone never even considered by the national
electoral constituency-would have controlled the White House for more
than three years, until an election in November 2004 and presidential
Inauguration in January 2005. On this point, it is irrelevant whether that
acting president is the Speaker or the Secretary of State; the problem in
terms of the democratic principle arises from the White House being
occupied for almost a full presidential term by anyone not elected by the
voters of the national constituency according to established procedures.
A special election becomes the only way to respect the democratic
principle. It would remove the word "acting" from in front of the name of
the person holding the White House, as selection through formal constitu-
tional procedures (as opposed to succession via congressional statute)
makes her the President; this is a not insignificant symbolic benefit. More
importantly, the election would provide the new President the direct
popular imprimatur of the national electoral constituency.27 Her demo-
cratic legitimacy in serving the remaining years of the presidential term
now derives not from the apostolic legitimacy of her initial selection as a
Cabinet officer and power delagatee by the former President, but from the
affirmatively expressed will of the national constituency in specifically
choosing her for that office.
Importantly, the provision for a special election does not obviate the
need for the suggested changes in the succession order. The goal, whenever
possible, is the best accommodation of all three structural principles,
individually and on balance. Even with a special election, an acting
president might serve for as long as a year (if the double vacancy occurs
during a quadrennial presidential election year) and at least for several
months-not an entirely insubstantial amount of time. The proper official,
that is, the officer whose succession is most consistent with these three
structural principles, should be the acting president during that time period,
no matter how short.
276 See discussion supra notes 206-21 and accompanying text.
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It is true that, because an acting president will not simply serve out the
multi-year balance of a presidential term, there will be less incentive for a
legislative officer to manipulate the political process in order to make
herself acting president.2' However, the incentives do not disappear. The
acting president might have an advantage in any special election, given the
benefit of incumbency and the aura of having guided the nation through the
tragedy and crisis that created the double vacancy. One could imagine an
acting presidentPowell easily winning a special election held seven months
after a September 11 attack that had killed the President and Vice
President. Such an outcome would promote democratic and policy
continuity in a time of war.
A Speaker willing to gamble that she could win that election (which
might be a regular presidential election resulting in a four-year term)
running as the incumbent still might give in to the conflicts of interests and
negative incentives that exist when a legislator is in the line of
succession.278 In other words, the special election provision alone does not
eliminate political gamesmanship by a legislative officer. The special
election must be accompanied by a system of cabinet succession in order
to be fully effective.
Alternatively, legislative succession does not fit with a special election.
The Speaker or President Pro Tem must, under both the Constitution and
the statute, resign her legislative office and seat in order to become acting
president.2'"A special election provision makes any double vacancy and the
term of an acting president temporary and short-term. This contrasts with
the current version of § 19, under which an acting president could serve
almost a full presidential term.28°
After acting as President for six months or so, the Speaker (assuming
she did not win the new presidential election) would find herself out of the
White House, but also out of her congressional office and seat.28' The
Speaker, unless willing to gamble that she could win the special election,
likely would decline to become acting president by not resigning from
Congress and remaining ineligible for the presidency, allowing the
executive power to carry into the cabinet. Given this likelihood, it makes
277 See discussion supra notes 78-84 and accompanying text.
278 See discussion supra notes 157-62 and accompanying text.
279 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2; 3 U.S.C. § 19(a)(1), (b) (1994).
280 See discussion supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
281Cf Brown & Cinquegrana, supra note 1, at 1437 (describing the unfairness
that anyone who resigned to act as President during a temporary vacancy would be
out of ajob altogether when the vacancy ended).
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sense simply to remove the legislators entirely from the succession order
and send the executive power directly to cabinet officers 2
CONCLUSION
Section 19 is a good illustration ofthe effect and operation of structural
principles and how those principles must be considered, analyzed, and
accommodated in designing and operating selection procedures. Congress
and President Truman, in drafting and passing § 19, explicitly sought to
accommodate two such principles: political partisanship and democracy.
Closer examination of these principles shows that they did not do so and
that the chosen procedure is not, in fact, the best way to accommodate
either one. Moreover, the statute entirely ignores concerns of separation of
powers, creating additional problems.
Section 19 and its predecessors never have been triggered, even during
those lengthy periods prior to 1967 in which the President served without
a Vice President. Often, the statute is brought into the legal and public eye
only during odd moments, such as Alexander Haig's infamous press
conference in March 1981. It exists primarily for the event of extreme
political machinations or extreme and tragic events that might raise
concerns not only for the life of the President but also for the continued
stability and viability of the federal government and the constitutional
structure.
However, we witnessed a potential trigger event on September 11, an
attack that may have targeted the highest officers of the federal govern-
ment. That event and the threat of repeated similar attacks raise the specter
of double-vacancy succession to a different level. It warrants reconsidera-
tion of § 19 and replacement with the best possible succession order, a
scheme that best serves and promotes the guiding principles that dictate
selection decisions under the Constitution. Considering those structural
principles individually and in an overall balance, the succession order
should include only cabinet officers, starting with the Secretary of State,
and should provide for a special election to choose a new President and
Vice President as expeditiously as possible.
' The current version of § 19 requires that cabinet officers also resign upon
becoming acting president, raising the same problem. See 3 U.S.C. § 19(d)(3)
(providing that "[tihe taking of the oath of office by [a cabinet officer] shall be held
to constitute his resignation" from the cabinet office). However, this is not a
constitutional requirement and need not be included in the amended statute.
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